COMMENTS
FEDERAL COMITY, OFFICIAL IMMUNITY, AND THE
DILEMMA OF SECTION 1983
Section 1983 of title 42, United States Code, provides a civil remedy

in the federal courts for persons whose -federalrights have been
denied by anyone acting "under color of' state law.

Typically,

those who act "under color of' state law are state officials-ranging
from governor to policeman. However, in many section 1983 suits,

the purpose of the statute conflicts with the policy of protecting
the working balance between the states and the federal govern-

ment, or with the goal of ensuring impartialityof decision-making
by state officials. The dilemma thus posed has been resolved by

federal courts in various ways, depending on the type of state
official or state function involved. This comment seeks to identify
the solutions which the courts have adopted.

to assure citizens their constitutional rights
themes of American history for almost
dominant
of
the
has been one
1 In many recent cases, the statutory starting point has
two decades.
been the enactments of the Reconstruction Congresses.2 One such
statute was originally enacted in 1871 as part of the Third Enforcement Act 3 and is presently codified in section 1983 of title 42 of the
United States Code, which reads as follows:
THE

JUDICIAL EFFORT

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or any Territory, subjects, or
'Landmark decisions of the Supreme Court in recent years include Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (criminal confessions); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964) (public accommodations integration); Escobedo v. Illinois, 878 U.S. 478
(1964) (criminal confessions); Reynolds v. Sims, 877 U.S. 583 (1964) (reapportionment);
Engle v. Vitale, 870 U.S. 421 (1962) (establishment of religion); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (freedom from illegal search and seizure); and Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school desegregation).
2Leading cases in which Reconstruction statutes figured prominently include United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) [18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964); formerly Act of May 31,
1870, ch. 114, § 17, 16 Stat. 144, as amended, REv. STAT. § 5510 (1875)]; United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) [18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964); formerly Act of May 81, 1870, ch.
114, § 6, 16 Stat. 141]; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) [REv. STAT. § 1977
(1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964); formerly Act of May 81, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat.
144]; Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 878 U.S. 647 (1963) [REV. STAT. § 1980 (1875), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 (8) (1964); formerly Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13]; and United
States v. Barnett, 330 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1963), aft'd, 376 U.S. 681 (1964) [10 U.S.C. § 833
(1964); formerly Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 14].
'Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 18.
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causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
at law, suit
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
4
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The statute's language sets forth the two requirements for imposing liability: (1) there must be a deprivation of "rights, privi-

leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws"; and (2)
the defendant causing the deprivation must be acting "under color
of" state law.5 The first requisite merely rephrases the fourteenth
amendment: 6 any right guaranteed by the amendment is made the
basis for a civil remedy. The second was suggested by the language
of the amendment itself, which affords protection only if a state

violates a federal right, privilege, or immunity. By requiring that
a defendant be acting "under color of" state authority when depriving
others of rights, section 1983 sufficiently satisfied the "state action"
requirement.7

The implementation of these two requisites has proved more
difficult than a perusal of the statutory language would suggest.
One major problem has been the delineation of the scope of rights
protected by section 1983.8 However, the primary focus of this
IREV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). Section 1983 is dervied from § I
of the Act of April 20, 1871. When the 1871 Act was reenacted in the Revised Statutes
(1875), numerous changes in wording were made in § 1 by the revisors. However,
since these changes simply broadened the scope of the rights which could be vindicated
under the statute, they are of no consequence for purposes of this comment. See generally Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the FrontiersBeyond, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 277 (1965).
E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th Cir.
1966); Mosher v. Beirne, 357 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1966); Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d
601 (9th Cir. 1965); Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 975 (1964); Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962); Cohen v. Norris,
300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
6 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 566, 698 (1871) [covering 1833-1873J (remarks
of Senator Edmunds); id. at app. 79 (remarks of Representative Perry). Representative
Duke objected to the characterization of § 1983 as a rephrasing of the fourteenth
amendment, claiming instead that it was an effort to extend federal power beyond the
amendment's limitations: "The original text of the Constitution and the fourteenth
amendment both use the terms 'privileges' and 'immunities,' and none other. Why
Now, sir, I ask, were not the words 'any right'
was not this language adhered to? ...
interpolated in order to give color of jurisdiction to the Federal courts in all cases
whatever?" Id. at app. 91.
See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966); notes 86-88 infra and accompanying text. For a useful collection of secondary sources discussing the concept, see
Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State
Action, 1965 DuKE LJ. 219, 222 n.6, 231 n.34.
"A discussion of the scope of rights protected by § 1983 is beyond the purview of
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comment will be the meaning of the phrase "under color of any
statute ... of any State," the doctrine of official immunity, and the
principle of federal comity as these three concepts relate to and affect
the issue of who may be liable under this enactment. After a brief
inquiry into the evolution and present meaning of the phrase "under
color of" and the reasons underlying the doctrines of immunity and
comity, this comment will examine in detail the liability under
section 1983 of state officials, including judges, prosecutors, clerks of
court and other ministerial officers, legislators, members of school
boards and city councils, high executive officers, prison and mental
hospital administrators, and law enforcement officials.
THE ENAcrMENT OF SECTION

1983

To facilitate a meaningful discussion of the question of who may
be held liable under the statute, an understanding of its inception is
helpful. The enacting legislators viewed the predecessor of section
1983 as part of a comprehensive congressional plan-the Third Enforcement Act 9-designed generally to combat the lawlessness that
allegedly existed in the South in 187110 and specifically to provide
federal remedies for asserted denials of newly-granted fourteenth
this comment. However, the issue has been extensively treated elsewhere. See generally
Poole, Statutory Remedies for the Protection of Civil Rights, 32 ORE. L. REv. 210
(1953); Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the FrontiersBeyond, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 277 (1965); Comment, Immunity of Public Officials From Liability Under the
Federal Civil Rights Acts, 18 ARK. L. REv. 81 (1964); Comment, The Civil Rights Acts
and Mr. Monroe, 49 CALIF. L. RaV. 145 (1961); Note, Liability of Public Officers to
Suit Under the Civil Rights Acts, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 614 (1946); Note, The Doctrine of
Official Immunity Under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1229 (1955); Note,
The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1285 (1953); Note, 42
U.S.C. § 1983-Civil Remedy-Its Circumvention and Emasculation, 12 How. L.J. 285
(1966); Note, Civil Rights Act Section 1983: Abuses by Law Enforcement Officers, 36
IND. L.J. 317 (1961); Note, Section 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Protection of Federal
Rights, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 839 (1964); Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1871: Continuing
Vitality, 40 NonRE DAME LAW. 70 (1964).
'Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
10 The alleged lawlessness and disorder in the South was the overriding concern
in the Congressional debates. See, e.g., CONG. GLoBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 320 (1871)
[covering 1833-1873] (remarks of Representative Stoughton); id. at 436 (remarks of
Representative Cobb); id. at 459 (remarks of Representative Coburn); id. at 653
(remarks of Senator Osborn); id. at 655 (remarks of Senator Sawyer); id. at app. 78
(remarks of Representative Perry); id. at app. 185 (remarks of Representative Platt);
id. at app. 190 (remarks of Representative Buckley); id. at app. 263 (remarks of Representative Barry); id. at app. 283 (remarks of Representative Stevenson); id. at app. 307
(remarks of Representative Maynard); id. at app. 312 (remarks of Representative
Burchard). See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
50 MICH. L. REv. 1323 (1952).
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amendment rights." According to the Republican proponents, the
major reasons for the denials of federal rights were the organized
crime and violence fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, 12 the allegedly
continuing attitude of rebellion among southern leaders, 13 and the
conspiracy by the Democratic Party and the Klan to drive the Republicans from the South.14 It was felt that these conditions had
rendered state governments either incapable or unwilling to protect
the rights of their citizens. 5 Reasoning from this premise, the
Republicans conceived it the duty of Congress to respond with a
remedy.' 6 Under the comprehensive plan of the Third Enforcement
11

Representative Shellabarger of Ohio, floor manager of the bill in the House, re-

marked that "the provisions of the fourteenth amendment are wholly devoted to
securing the equality and safety of all the people, as is this section [the predecessor of
§ 1983], and, indeed, the entire bill." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68 (1871)
[covering 1833-1873]. See id. at 429 (remarks of Representative McHenry); id. at 461
(remarks of Representative Roberts); id. at app. 185 (remarks of Representative Platt).
See generally Davis, The Federal Enforcement Acts, in STUDIES IN SOUTHERN HISTORY
AND POLITICS 205, 216-17 (1914).
12 According to Representative Burchard, "in portions of the Union secret organizations exist, banded together to prevent the free exercise of civil and political rights.
Through their agency the lives and persons of political opponents are doomed to
violence and outrage and the perpetrators of the crime screened from detection and
punishment. Where they have sprung up life is insecure and murder goes unpunished.
The victims of their hate, bruised and maimed for life, abandoning home and possessions, are compelled to flee in terror to other regions for safety." CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. app. 312 (1871) [covering 1833-1878]. See, e.g., id. at 820 (remarks of

Representative Stoughton); id. at 686 (remarks of Senator Schurz); id. at app. 184-85
(remarks of Representative Platt); id. at app. 263 (remarks of Representative Barry);
id. at app. 283-84 (remarks of Representative Stevenson). See generally RANDALL &
DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUcTION 682-85 (2d ed. 1961).

"sAfter an independent study of the South, Senator Schurz-a "reformed Radical"reported that the disorders in the South "had their origin in the baffled pro-slavery
spirit of the people lately in rebellion .... [T]here can be no doubt as to the condition of the popular mind in the late rebel states which brought forth the condition of
things which we are now deploring." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 686 (1871)

[covering 1833-1873]. See, e.g., id. at app. 190 (remarks of Representative Buckley).
Contra, id. at 397-99 (remarks of Representative Roosevelt). See generally RANDALL
& DONALD, op. cit. supra note 12, at 596.
"'E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 320 (1871) [covering 1833-1873] (remarks
of Representative Stoughton); id. at 412-13 (remarks of Representative Roberts); id.
at 436-37 (remarks of Representative Cobb); id. at 441-43 (remarks of Representative
Butler); id. at app. 203 (remarks of Representative Garrett); id. at app. 276-77 (remarks of Representative Porter).
"E.g., id. at 368 (remarks of Representative Sheldon); id. at 456 (remarks of
Representative Coburn); id. at 486 (remarks of Representative Tyner); id. at 487 (remarks of Representative Lansing); id. at 653 (remarks of Senator Osborn); id. at 686
(remarks of Senator Schurz); id. at app. 300 (remarks of Representative Stevenson); id.
at app. 507-08 (remarks of Representative Maynard).
1
6Representative Austin Blair, in commenting on Congress's duty "to protect the
citizens against armed bands of assassins," succinctly stated the Republican position:
"It ought to be the duty of both the State and the nation to do this; and if the State
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Act,' the enacting legislators attempted to rectify alleged denials of
civil rights in two steps: first, by providing various criminal and
military procedures for use against the Klan and other groups which
might deny federal rights to any citizen;' 8 and secondly, by authorizing civil actions against both persons who fail to enforce the law
equally and those who conspire to deprive others of their federal
rights.' 9
The Democratic opposition condemned the Third Enforcement
Act as disruptive of the federal-state balance because it permitted unwarranted federal intervention in local affairs.20 Although the act
will not, the nation must."

Id. at app. 73; see, e.g., id. at 332 (remarks of Representa-

tive Hoar); id. at 604 (remarks of Senator Pool); id. at 653 (remarks of Senator Osborn);
id. at app. 68 (remarks of Representative Shellabarger); id. at app. 85 (remarks of
Representative Bingham); id. at app. 149 (remarks of Representative Garfield); id.
at app. 277 (remarks of Representative Porter). See generally Davis, supra note 11, at
206-07.

17 See generally Comment, Federal Intervention in the States for the Suppression of
Domestic Violence: Constitutionality, Statutory Power, and Policy, 1966 DuKE L.J. 415,
419 n.23.
11 Sections 3 (presently 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1964)) and 4 (17 Stat. 14 (1871), expiring
according to its own terms) of the Third Enforcement Act were designed to give the
President authority to send troops to the South and to suspend habeas corpus, if need
be, in order to suppress Klan violence. Section 2 (REv. STAT. §§ 629, 699, 5336, 5406-07,
5518, 5519, 5520 (1875)) provided criminal penalties for those who conspired to obstruct
justice, hinder an officer in the performance of his duty, or deprive others of rights.
Most of these provisions of § 2 have been either repealed or declared unconstitutional.
See Comment, FederalIntervention in the States for the Suppression of Domestic Violence: Constitutionality, Statutory Power, and Policy,.1966 DuK LJ. 415, 419 n.23.
President Grant immediately put these federal remedies into operation against the
Klan. Hundreds of arrests and convictions were the result. Federal troops were
dispatched to areas of serious outlaw activity. See RANDALL & DONALD, op. cit. supra
note 12, at 684. "By such methods the Klan was effectively dispersed. Its existence
virtually came to an end in 1871." Ibid.
10 One original civil action provided in § 2 of the 1871 Act (REv. STAT. § 1980
(1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) (1964)) was designed to afford relief for conspiracy to deprive others of federal rights. This remedy was severely restricted by the Supreme
Court in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951). The other civil action was § 1 of
the 1871 Act, which grounded its remedy on direct violation of federal rights by
persons acting "under color of" state law. (REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1964)).
20 Representative Archer of Maryland opposed the Third Enforcement Act because
he felt it represented a usurpation of power by the federal government. Thus, he
noted that "of the first and second sections, it is enough to say that they are in direct
conflict with the reserved rights of the states as they have heretofore been understood
and exercised by the states through their own laws and tribunals." CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 373 (1871) [covering 1833-1873]. For similar objections, see, e.g.,
id. at 361 (remarks of Representative Swann); id. at 366 (remarks of Representative
Arthur); id. at 384 (remarks of Representative Lewis); id. at 395 (remarks of Representative Rice); id. at 454 (remarks of Representative Cox); id. at app. 50 (remarks of
Representative Kerr); id. at app. 74-75 (remarks of Representative Wood); id. at app.
207-08 (remarks of Representative J. Blair).
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was formally national in scope, the Democrats felt that it was aimed
exclusively at the South and therefore unjustified, arguing that
violence in the South was no more serious than that in the North
22
or West.21 Even if the disorder as characterized by the Republicans
did exist in the South, the Democrats blamed incompetent and corrupt Republican state governments for their tolerance of the situation, 23 and suggested amnesty for southern leaders as the means for
24
obtaining capable men to hold offices then held by Negroes.
Finally, they urged that Congress lacked the power to enact legislation to enforce the fourteenth amendment. 25 Albeit Democrats and
Republicans disagreed as to the cause and extent of the disorder in
the South, both asserted that the southern state governments were
either unable or unwilling to carry out their proper governmental
duties.26 Thus, with the failure of state government clearly stated by
both parties, the proponents of the Third Enforcement Act un21

E.g., id. at 336 (remarks of Representative Whitthorne); id. at 361 (remarks
of Representative Swann); id. at 600-01 (remarks of Senator Saulsbury); id. at app. 50
(remarks of Representative Kerr); id. at 134-37 (remarks of Representative McCormick).
2
1 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
23 Representative Roosevelt, representing the views of many of his Democratic
colleagues, honestly admitted dissatisfaction "with the laws, with the manner in which
they are administered, and with the conduct of public officials in many portions of the
South. . . . The origin of this discontent is . . . in our national legislature ....
You, my Republican friends . . . have turned over the affairs of the southern States
to negroes; and it is no discredit to them to say that they possessed no qualifications
for the positions which you insisted they should fill." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 400 (1871) [covering 1833-1873]. For similar views, see, e.g., id. at 356 (remarks
of Representative Beck); id. at app. 203-05 (remarks of Representative Garrett). See
generally RANDALL & DONALD, op. cit. supra note 12, at 624.
24
E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 431 (1871) [covering 1833-1873] (remarks
of Representative McHenry); id. at 509-10 (remarks of Representative Eldridge); id.
at app. 205 (remarks of Representative Garrett); id. at app. 300-01 (remarks of Representative Critcher). See the remarks of Representative Roosevelt, note 23 supra.
25Representative McHenry expressed the Democratic viewpoint regarding the
method by which the fourteenth amendment was to be enforced: "It is for the
States to enforce this provision by abstaining from the enactment of such laws as
conflict with it, and the courts to protect citizens by upholding and regarding the
higher law of the Constitution." Id. at 429. See, e.g., id. at app. 49 (remarks of
Representative Kerr); id. at app. 206 (remarks of Representative J. Blair). See generally
Davis, supra note 11, at 207.
2
6 Some Democrats readily admitted the incompetency of state governments in the
South. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 400 (1871) [covering 1833-1873] (remarks of Representative Roosevelt); id. at app. 205 (remarks of Representative Garrett); id. at app. 257-58 (remarks of Representative Holman); note 23 supra and accompanying text. Republican Representatives also made similar declarations with a
view toward justifying extension of federal power. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
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doubtedly intended that the predecessor of section 1983 act not only
as a vehicle for personal redress, but also as a negative incentive to
state and local government officials, on penalty of personal liability,
to perform their duties properly.27
Although the objectives of the Third Enforcement Act were
copiously stated,28 debate construing the actual function and scope of
section 1983 is scant. This dearth of discussion is partially explained
by the fact that the Republican majority addressed itself chiefly to
the constitutional justifications for the act and the necessity for its
remedial provisions including section 1983.29 For the most part,
Democrats were greatly disturbed by the criminal and military aspects
of the proposed legislation, and therefore devoted less attention to the
precursor of section 1983. However, the few Democrats who concerned themselves with that section objected with partisan fervor
that state officials, including judges and legislators, would be subjected to examination in the federal courts3 0 and that the balance
27

In describing the forces which gave impetus to the passage of the Third Enforcement Act, the United States Commission on Civil Rights stated that one key factor was
that "sentiment in favor of maintaining the new southern governments, by Federal
force, if necessary, grew even stronger" as more and more reports of violence in the
South filtered in. U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, FREEDOM TO THE FRE 48 (1963). The
history of reconstruction before 1871 seems to bear out this conclusion. Thus, when
the federal troops were sent into the South to carry out the military reconstruction
ordered by Congress, they performed many police functions normally executed by state
and local governments. However, the orders from the army headquarters show that
this was not deemed desirable. Thus, in 1870 federal forces were commanded to
cooperate with state civil authorities in making arrests, not to replace the state officials
or do their duty for them. See Davis, supra note 11, at 213-15; Cf. RANDALL &
DONALD, op. cit. supra note 12, at 598. The Third Enforcement Act of 1871, by providing federal supplemental help for the States against the Klan, seems in accord
with this command.
28 See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
20 Several Republican sponsors of the act treated it section by section. See, e.g.,
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568, 698 (1871) [covering 1833-1873] (remarks of
Senator Edmunds); id. at 575 (remarks of Senator Trumbull); id. at app. 67 (remarks
of Representative Shellabarger); id. at app. 71 (remarks of Representative A. Blair);
id. at app. 78 (remarks of Representative Perry). However, their general attitude toward
the predecessor of 1983 was summed up by Senator Edmunds of Vermont, floor manager
of the bill in the Senate: "The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to, as
defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the United States when they are
assailed by any State law or under color of any State law .... ." Id. at 568. Several
other Congressmen, including both Republicans and Democrats, did not discuss the
predecessor of § 1983 either because they considered other sections of the bill more
demanding of their attention, or because they did not view it as making a great change
in the law. See, e.g., id. at 418 (remarks of Representative Bright); id. at 501 (remarks of Representative Frelinghuysen); id. at app. 86 (remarks of Representative
Storm); id. at app. 113 (remarks of Representative Farnsworth); id. at app. 209
(remarks of Representative J. Blair); id. at app. 268 (remarks of Representative Sloss).
20 Representative Lewis crystalized the Democratic opposition to the precursor of
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between federal and state governments would be radically altered
by federal assumption of jurisdiction over cases previously adjudicated in state tribunals. 31 The Republicans offered no retort to
Democratic contentions of possible liability for judges and legislators
and merely responded that the adoption of the fourteenth amend2
ment had altered once and for all the prewar federal-state balance.
Thus, legislative evidence on the issue of potential liability under
the present section 1983 is inconclusive, the chief concern instead
having been the purported extension of federal power.
JUDICIAL EVOLUTION OF SECTION

1983

"Under Color of' State Law
For seventy years after its enactment, those who feared federal
encroachment on state jurisdiction by the utilization of section 1983
had little complaint, as the statute was sparingly invoked. 33 The first
three Supreme Court cases involving section 198334 did not attempt
to define the meaning of the phrase "under color of." However, in
§ 1983: "Sir, this bill is a systematic and apparently studied attack on our form of
government. . . . By the first section, in certain cases, the judge of a State court,
though acting under oath of office, is made liable to a suit in the Federal court and
subject to damages for his decision against a suiter, however honest and conscientious
that decision may be ...." Id. at 566; see, e.g., id. at 366 (remarks of Representative
Arthur); id. at 429 (remarks of Representative McHenry); id. at app. 217 (remarks of
Senator Thurman).
IlDemocratic Senator Bayard vigorously objected to federal usurpation of state
power: "Therefore, sir, I do protest against any such interpretation of this fourteenth
amendment as shall in effect change the relations of the federal government to the states,
and deprive the states by action of this government of their control of their domestic
affairs." Id. at app. 243; see, e.g., id. at 866 (remarks of Representative Arthur);
id. at 429 (remarks of Representative McHenry); id. at 451 (remarks of Representative
Cox); id. at app. 216 (remarks of Senator Thurman); id. at app. 804 (remarks of Representative Slater).
32 Republican Representative Porter took the view that the fourteenth amendment
imposed a duty on Congress to act: "When a class of citizens of the United States are
systematically outraged ... and the State in which they reside is either incapable or unwilling to suppress .the outrages, it seems to me very clear that such State has denied
to this class the 'equal protection of the law,' and it becomes the duty of Congress under
the amendment, to afford such protection." Id. at app. 277. Representative Bingham
took an even stronger position: "The States never had the right, though they had
the power, to inflict wrongs upon free citizens by a denial of the full protection of
the laws; because all State officials are by the Constitution required to be bound by
oath or affirmation to support the Constitution." Id. at app. 85.
31During the first fifty years of its existence, § 1983 was employed only twenty-one
times. Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Civil Remedy?, 26
IND. L.J. 861, 363 (1951).
31 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Heradon, 273 U.S. 586 (1927);
Myers v. Anderson, 288 U.S. 868 (1915).
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upholding the liability of election officials who, while acting in
accordance with state laws subsequently held unconstitutional, had
deprived the plaintiffs of federal rights, the Court implicitly suggested that the phrase "under color of" meant that the offending
36
35
persons must act "pursuant to" state law. Later, in Hague v. CIO,
the Court seemed to apply a "pursuant to' construction while enjoining city officials from enforcing against a labor organization a local
ordinance which contravened its members' rights of free speech and
peaceful assembly.3 7
The interpretive development of the phrase "under color of" was
facilitated by the judicial construction of the identical wording contained in section 1983's criminal counterpart, section 242 of title 18,
United States Code.38 In United States v. Classic,39 defendant election officials asserted that section 242 was inapplicable because they
had acted contrary to and therefore not "pursuant to" Louisiana law,
and hence had not operated "under color of" law. The Supreme
Court rejected this contention, stating that "misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken
3Although the first three Supreme Court cases did not expressly rule that the
phrase "under color of" meant "pursuant to," that definition may be implied from the
result. In each case, the defendant election officials were held liable for acting according to valid state laws, which were only later declared unconstitutional in the suit
against them. Ibid.; see Shapo, ConstitutionalTort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers
Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 277, 283-84 (1965).
3807 U.S. 496 (1939), 39 CoLUM. L. RFv. 1237, 52 HAuv. L. Rav. 320.
87 Hague held that freedom to distribute information and the right to assemble,
privileges protected by the fourteenth amendment, were deprived by the enforcement
of the ordinance. Unable to agree with the Court's theory, Justices Stone and Reed
concurred on .the basis that the ordinance violated the due process clause. Despite this
difference in theory, the decision opened the way for further inclusion of Bill of
Rights freedoms within the scope of both the fourteenth amendment and § 1983.
8 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964): "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or
District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected
by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." (Emphasis added.) The key
similarities between §§ 242 and 1983 lie in the fact that both employ the phrase "under
color of" and both are directed at those who deprive others of federally protected rights.
However, it should be noted that an element of wilfulness is required by § 242, whereas
§ 1983 contains no such requirement. Compare Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,
105 (1945), with Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). A second difference
between the two statutes is that the authority "under color of" which a defendant
acts when prosecuted under § 242 need not be state law, as is true in the case of
§ 1988.
8313 U.S. 299 (1941), 41 CoLum. L. R1v. 1101 (1941), 20 N.C.L. R1v. 93 (1941),
40 MicI. L. REv. 460 (1942).
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'under color of' state law." 40 This expanded definition of "under
color of," which encompassed acts cloaked with state authority, gained
further acceptance in Snowden v. Hughes.41 Although the Snowden
Court rejected a section 1983 claim on another ground, it implied
that state officials who infringe federal rights while violating state
law may be liable under section 1983.42

Later in Screws v. United

43

States, which also involved section 242, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Classic approach and further clarified the meaning of
the phrase "under color of." 44 In Screws, the defendant sheriff,
exercising his lawful power to make arrests, exceeded his authority to
use force and caused the deprivation of the life of the victim without
due process. Holding that he had nonetheless acted "under color
of" state law, the Court stated that "under color of" meant "under
pretense of" law, which included both authorized and unauthorized
acts by "officers who undertake to perform their official duties. ' 45
The evolution of section 1983 from its enactment until the Screws
decision produced two principal results. First, the defense that a
state officer whose actions violate state law is not "under color of"
law was thrice rejected. Secondly, in broadly interpreting the phrase
"under color of" to mean "under pretense of," the Supreme Court
delineated the outer circle for defining the scope of liability under
section 1983. What operative facts would constitute a "pretense" of
state authority remained to be determined; nonetheless the phrase at
In so holding, the Supreme Court merely adapted its earlier
40 313 U.S. at 326.
construction of the fourteenth amendment to § 1983 situations. See Home Tel. & Tel.

Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1912).

41321 U.S. 1 (1944), 32 GEo. L. Rv. 435.
42 In Snowden, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant election officials had infringed his federal rights because they had refused in violation of Illinois law to place
his name on a state ballot as Republican nominee for a state senate seat. Although
the Supreme Court dismissed the claim by holding that plaintiff had no federallyprotected right to seek state political office, it did not discuss whether § 1983 was inapplicable because defendants had acted in violation of, rather than "pursuant to"

state law.

I8325 U.S. 91 (1945), 44 MicH. L. Rav. 814 (1946), 55 YALE L.J. 576 (1946); see
Cohen, The Screws Case: Federal Protection of Negro Rights, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 94
(1946).
"1325 U.S. at 109-10.
'p325 U.S. at 111. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas asserted: "It is clear
that under 'color' of law means under 'pretense' of law. Thus acts of officers in the
ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly excluded. Acts of officers who undertake
to perform their official duties are included whether they hew to the line of their
authority or overstep it." Ibid. Three justices dissented, citing the congressional
history of § 242 for the proposition that "under color of" meant acting according
to law. Id. at 142-44.
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least meant that the offending person would be within the outer
46
circle if he was "clothed with the authority of state law."
Official Immunity
The Supreme Court, in designating the outer circle of potential
liability under section 1983, used as its guideline the "under color

of" language of the statute itself. Although the debates surrounding
the predecessor of section 1983 evidence concern that certain par-

ticular officials would come within its purview,47 neither the enacting
legislators, the text of the statute, nor the courts construing its pro-

visions specifically mentioned the inner circle of limitations which
courts subsequent to Screws have engrafted onto the statute.

That

48
limitation is the common law doctrine of official immunity.
Historically, common law official immunity has been characterized

as a complete defense for "discretionary" officials of government sued

for damages on the basis of acts performed within the scope of their
duties.4 9 The doctrine is primarily designed to promote the fearless
and impartial execution of duty by officials charged with the responsi-

bility of making judicial, legislative, or executive policy decisions.50
However, before a public official may successfully rely on immunity
6United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941); accord, Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d
74, 80 (3d Cir. 1965).
'7 See note 30 supra and accompanying text; notes 125, 137, 155, 178, 197, 210, 223,
255 infra and accompanying text.
48For cases discussing the "engrafting" of the immunity doctrine onto § 1983, see,
e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533
(9th Cir. 1965); Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1954); Cobb v. City of Malden,
202 F.2d 701 (Ist Cir. 1953).
"9See generally Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MicH. L. REv. 201
(1956); Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CALaF. L. REV. 303 (1959); Jaffe,
Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HAiv. L. REv. 209
(1963). For a discussion of the immunity defense in relation to § 1983's equitable
remedies, see note 69 infra and accompanying text.
" In Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871), the first Supreme Court discussion of official immunity, the Court stated: "[I]t is a general principle of the highest
importance to the proper administration of justice that a judical officer, in exercising
the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone
who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge, would be inconsistent with
the possession of this freedom, and would destroy the independence without which no
judiciary can either be respectable or useful." Id. at 347. The principle of Bradley
was strongly reaffirmed in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), the Court stating that
the fear of civil liability for decisional errors "would contribute not to principled and
fearless decision-making but to intimidation." Id. at 554. For an excellent discussion
of the rationale underlying official immunity, see Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533
(9th Cir. 1965); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 981 (1965).
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as a defense, two requisites must be met. First, he must be a "discretionary," as opposed to a "ministerial," officialY'" In the context
of official immunity, "discretionary" officials are those government
officers charged with the duty of using their independent judgment
to make important state decisions. 5 2 A second requirement is that
the official be acting within the scope of his duties.53 In making this
determination, courts have been somewhat lenient because the line
between authorized and unauthorized activity is often difficult to
discern. Indeed, some acts of officials which are not specifically
authorized have nevertheless been considered "within the scope of
their duties." For example, a judge will normally be granted official
immunity if his unauthorized action is merely in "excess of [his]
jurisdiction," as opposed to having been done with "clear absence of
all jurisdiction over the subject-matter."5 4 Other officials have been
51"Present day decisions have tended to erode the common law meaning of many
words and phrases used in legal literature, and as a result the word 'discretion' as it
is now generally used in the law, is but an anemic facsimile of a robust ancestor."
Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963).
Efforts continue to be made, however, to define discretion. For example, Jaffe has
defined the term as the "power and duty to choose between valid alternatives." Jaffe,
supra note 51, at 318. Yet, "almost all human conduct" involves the use of this kind
of "discretion." See Note, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 66 I-IAiv. L. REv. 488, 490 (1953). Therefore, it is essential to delimit the
term discretion, since even "ministerial" officers such as policeman may have to make
some choices between valid alternatives in deciding whether an arrest should be made.
See generally Davis, supra note 49.
52See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564
(1959); United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
971 (1965); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981
(1965) The doctrine of immunity was intended to prevent the individual official from
being confronted with the choice between loyalty to official duty and fear of personal
liability. However, the state's well-being, which depends on an honest and unreserved
exercise of judgment, is deemed to be sufficiently jeopardized to justify the denial of
redress to injured persons only when such a division of loyalty affects "discretionary"
public officials.
Factors which may help to determine whether an official may be classified as
"discretionary" include the following: (1) the statute which creates the office uses the
term discretion or other words of permission, as opposed to language of a mandatory
nature; (2) the type of decision required of the officer requires expertise and judgment;
(3) the officer's rank in the government hierarchy is deemed "high" as compared to
other officials; (4) the decisions which the official makes affect great numbers of people,
as contrasted to decisions which result in individual private torts. See Note, The
Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 66 -ARV. L. REv.
488, 491-98 (1953).
53See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-73 (1959);
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335,
351 (1871). See generally Davis, supra note 51.
5
1'E.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871); Bauers v. Heisel, 361
F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967). An example of an action
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viewed as acting within the scope of their duties if their unauthorized
acts fall within the range of activities typically associated with the
responsibilities of their positions. 55 In these situations, they are not
required to justify their acts by showing specific authorization.
In the first case in which the defense of official immunity was
asserted to a section 1983 claim for damages, Picking v. Pennsylvania
R.R.,5 6 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied its availability to a justice of the peace and a state governor. The court
awarded damages after finding that these state officials had extradited
the plaintiff from Pennsylvania to New York without due process.
In denying the defense of immunity, the Picking court reasoned that
the language of section 1983, requiring that "every person" who deprived another of federal rights "under color of" state law be held
liable, admitted of no exceptions. 57 However, Picking's expansive
interpretation was short-lived.58 In the landmark case of Tenney
v. Brandhove, 9 the plaintiff sought damages from members of a
California legislative committee whom he alleged had deprived him
of his fourteenth amendment rights by publicly ridiculing and intimi"in excess of jurisdiction" is where a judge makes a mistake of law by admitting inadmissible evidence, which results in a conviction. Although his decision is reversable
on appeal, he would still be protected from civil liability by judicial immunity.
However, if he acts with "clear absence of jurisdiction," as when he obviously lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the doctrine of official immunity is not available
to him. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, supra. The reason a "discretionary official" is
not held liable even though he acts "in excess of jurisdiction" was enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Bradley: "Indeed some of the most difficult and embarrassing questions which a judicial officer is called upon to consider and determine relate to his
jurisdiction, or that of the court held by him, or the manner in which the jurisdiction
shall be exercised." Id. at 352. See Pierson v. Ray, supra note 53, for a modem statement of the Bradley rationale.
1 For example, an activity falling within the range of activities typically associated
with a legislator is the issuance of a subpoena pursuant to a committee investigation.
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967). For other examples of activities falling
within an "outer perimeter" of duties associated with a particular office, see United States
v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 971 (1965).
"' 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947), 46 COLUm. L. Rv.
614 (1946), overruled, Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 584 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1021 (1967).
7 151 F.2d at 249. After finding that "every person" clearly included judges and
governors, the court concluded that "Congress by enacting the Civil Rights Act sub
judice intended to abrogate the privilege [of official immunity] to the extent indicated
by that act and in fact did so." Id. at 250.
" A few lower federal court decisions purported to follow the Picking decision.
See McShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949); Burt v. City of New York, 156
F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946).
' 341 U.S. 367 (1951), 3 MERcER L. REv. 221 (1951), 30 TExAs L. Rav. 516 (1952),
20 U. CINc. L. Rv. 511 (1951).
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dating him before the committee because he had refused to testify.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court decision which had
cited the Picking decision,60 stated that section 1983 did not abrogate
the common law defense of legislative immunity.6' Acknowledging
that the scope of section 1983 was not spelled out in the congressional
debates, 62 the Court nevertheless could not "believe that Congressitself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom-would impinge on a
tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion
in [section 1983's] . . . general language before us." 6

Mr. Justice

Frankfurter traced the "privilege of legislators to be free from arrest
or civil process for what they do or say in legislative proceedings"0 4
to its inception and found the privilege essential to our form of government, for it enables and encourages "a representative of the public
to discharge his public trust with firmness and success."0' 5 Thus, in
spite of the use of the phrase "every person" in the statutory language
of section 1983, the Tenney Court decreed that legislative immunity
60
was available as a defense.

00 Brandhove

v. Tenney, 183 F.2d 121, 124 (9th Cir. 1950).
61 341 U.S. at 376. In interpreting the Tenney decision two years later in Cobb v.
City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953), Judge Magruder of the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit stated: "[T]he Supreme Court in effect has held, in Tenney v.
Brandhove, that the act merely expresses a prima facie liability, leaving to the courts
to work out, from case to case, the defenses, by way of official privileges which might
be appropriate to the particular case." Id. at 706. This same language was repeated
in Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583, 588 (1st Cir. 1954). The Magruder view finds some
support in the language used by Senator Thurman in opposing the enactment of the
Third Enforcement Act: "I take it that if that [the interpretation of the meaning of
the "rights" and "privileges," and of "any person" in the predecessor of § 1983] is to
be left to judicial decisions, as it is here entirely, without any definition on our part,
there may be almost as many decisions as there are judges of the Federal courts . . "
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 216 (1871) [covering 1833-1873]. (Emphasis

added.)
It seems clear that the "defenses by way of official privilege," which were to be
worked out through judicial decision can only be those defenses properly recognized
by the common law of the states. Thus, the Tenney Court based the legislative immunity exception to liability under § 1983 on English common law decisions which
extended back as far as the sixteenth century. In the recent case of Pierson v. Ray,
886 U.S. 547 (1967), the Supreme Court affirmed that judicial immunity was also a
defense to a § 1983 damage claim because the congressional history of § 1983 gave "no
clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities."
Id. at 554. (Emphasis added.) For a discussion of Pierson, see notes 169-77, 281-90 infra.
2 341 U.S. at 376.
63 Ibid.
6, Id. at 372.

"5 Id. at 373, quoting from 2 WoRKs OF JAMES WILSON (Andrews ed. 1896) 38.
08 Mr. Justice Douglas sharply dissented in Tenney, stating that "if a committee
departs so far from its domain to deprive a citizen of a right protected by the Constitution, I can think of no reason why it should be immune." Id. at 382.
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However, since Tenney was concerned only with legislators as
defendants, the crucial question of the availability of official immunity to other state officials was left unanswered.6 7 Nevertheless,
by ruling that the doctrine was a possible defense to a section 1983
claim against legislators, the decision did suggest a second criterion
for determining who may be held liable under section 1983.68
Therefore, after Tenney, a tenative answer to the question of liability
in damages under the statute was possible: to be held liable, a person
had to fall within the outer circle of "under color of" state authority
as defined in Classic and Screws, but outside the inner circle of
officials entitled to official immunity.
Federal Comity
Although official immunity might insulate "discretionary" state
officials from liability in damages, it could offer no protection against
injunctive relief based on section 1983.69 Presumably, therefore,
injunctions could be issued under the statute upon proof that federal
rights would be deprived "under color of" state law.70 However,
the possibility of frequent federal equitable intervention against
state officials posed a serious threat to the working balance between
federal and state governments. 71 In order to protect this balance, the
87
68 See note 91 infra.
Although not expressly disapproving Picking, the Tenney Court's decision to
allow legislative immunity as a defense had the effect of discrediting the Picking interpretation that § 1983 completely abrogated the doctrine of official immunity. See, e.g.,
Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 855 (1956); Tate v.
Arnold, 223 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1955); Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1954);
Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953). See generally Comment, Immunity of Public Officials from Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts, 18 ARK.
L. REv. 81 (1965); Note, The Doctrineof Official Immunity Under the Civil Rights Acts.
68 HARV. L. REv. 1229 (1955); Note, 42 U.S.C. § 1983-Civil Remedy-Its Circumvention
and Emasculation, 12 How. L.J. 285 (1966).
00 The rule that official immunity offers no protection against § 1983 injunctive relief
was illustrated in Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963). In this suit for
an injunction against a state legislative committee, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit explicitly stated that the Supreme Court's decision in Tenney, which permitted the use of official immunity as a defense to § 1983 damage suits, did not prohibit
the issuance of an injunction. See, in addition, Due v. Tallahassee Theatres, Inc., 333
F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1964). Several cases, by failing to discuss the immunity issue when
injunctive relief was sought, have thereby implied that the immunity defense is not
available. See Labat v. McKeithen, 361 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1966); Wojcik v. Palmer, 318
F.2d 171 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930 (1963); Gately v. Sutton, 310 F.2d 107
(10th Cir. 1962).
'0 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
71 The Civil War and the constitutional changes which followed markedly altered
the original balance between the states and the federal government, the federal gov-
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doctrine of federal comity has been developed.7 2
The doctrine of comity is an expression of the policy that federal
courts should be restrained from interfering in state governmental
proceedings in order to avoid embarrassing conflicts between the
states and the federal government."
Congressional recognition of
ernment emerging dominant.

RANDALL

& DONALD,

THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

535, 633-37 (2d ed. 1961). However, the desirability of maintaining the states as vital
instruments of government was still recognized. Thus, instead of adopting a version
of the fourteenth amendment which gave Congress the "power to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper" to protect private citizens, CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1034 (1866) [covering 1833-1873] (remarks of Representative Bingham),
the Thirty-Ninth Congress approved the present negative limitation on state power,
largely because many congressmen felt the Bingham version would make state governments superfluous. Thus, Representative Hale argued that if the Bingham version
were passed, "all State legislation . . . affecting the individual citizen, may be overridden, may be repealed or abolished, and the law of Congress established instead."
Id. at 1063. Section 1983 was promulgated with the same concern for the continued
functioning of state government. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. This
desire to preserve the vitality of state governments is present today. State governments
still play an essential role in the governmental structure of the United States, providing many public services which can best be handled at the local level and serving
as small laboratories for government experimentation. See Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hart, The Relations Between State
and FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954).
Although the constitutional changes after the Civil War manifested a desire to
retain states as meaningful instruments of government, they also represented a change
in the concept of federalism. Whereas before the Civil War, the Constitution made
a clear division of powers between the two levels of government, the Civil War amendments blurred this division by permitting federal courts and Congress to supervise the
manner in which states performed their assigned functions. This new view of
federalism was summarized in the debates over the predecessor of § 1983: "It ought
to be the duty of both the State and the nation to [protect citizens from Klan violence] ... ; and if .the State will not, the nation must." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. app. 73 (1871) [covering 1833-1873] (remarks of Representative A. Blair); see
notes 16, 32 supra for citations to other congressional statements expressing the same
view. The power to determine the proper balance between the States and the federal
government was an implicit part of the federal government's new supervisory role
in the federal system. See Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54 COLUM. L. REv.
561, 562-63 (1954). The view of federalism that the states are to be given reasonable
opportunity to protect the rights of their citizens, but if they fail, then the federal
government will provide such protection has not been unanimously accepted. See
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202-59 (1961), (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); MARSHALL,
FEDERALIS M AND CIVIL

IGHTS

(1964). However, there is impressive authority in support

of it. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741
(1965) (per curiam); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Comment, Theories
of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007 (1966).
" Just as the doctrine of official immunity created an inner circle of nonliability
in damages under § 1983, so federal comity creates an inner circle of protection from
injunctive relief. However, the compass of the two inner circles is not identical. Whereas the inner circle of immunity from damages is primarily determined by the kind of
offidal-"discretionary" or "ministerial"--who is being sued, federal comity's inner
circle is delineated chiefly by the nature of the state function which the plaintiff
seeks to inhibit. Thus, comity will prohibit injunctive relief against state officials who
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the doctrine of federal comity is codified in section 2283 of title 28,
United States Code, which forbids federal courts from enjoining
state court proceedings, "except as expressly authorized" by Congress.7 4 While this statutory restraint on federal equity jurisdiction
75
applies only to cases which have been "commenced" in state courts,

state judicial proceedings constitute the type of state action which is
76
frequently challenged in section 1983 suits for injunctive relief.
are participants in a state court proceeding or a state legislative hearing, even if the
official is a policeman or other "ministerial" officer. See notes 83-86 infra. However,
an injunction may be issued against the same policeman when he seeks to enforce state
regulations violative of federal rights. See, e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197
(4th Cir. 1966).
"' The Supreme Court has explained the necessity for comity on these grounds:

"We live in .the jurisdiction of two sovereignties. Each has its own system of courts
to interpret and enforce its laws, although in common territory. These courts could
not perform their respective functions without embarrassing conflicts unless rules were
adopted to avoid them." Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 385 (1961). Later in
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965), the Court stated that in order for
federal courts to utilize comity to adjust the balance between state and federal governments, it must "be assumed that state courts and prosecutors will observe constitutional limitations as expounded by this Court, and that the mere possibility of
erroneous initial application of constitutional standards will usually not amount to
irreparable injury necessary to justify a disruption of orderly state proceedings." See
generally U.S. CIvIL RIGHTS COMM'N, LAw ENFORCEmENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH 121-29 (1965).
7 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964): "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments." The predecessor of § 2283 was originally § 5 of the Act of March 2, 1793,
ch. 22, 1 Stat. 334-35. It was later amended by the Judiciary Act of 1911 in 36 Stat.
1162 (1911) to apply specifically to proceedings in bankruptcy. The provision .took its
current form in the Judiciary Act of 1948, ch. 155, 62 Stat. 968 (1948). For an account
of the legislative history of § 2283, see Note, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 92, 97-105 (1966).
7rThe phrase "proceedings in a state court" has been said to include "all steps
taken or which may be taken in the state court or by its officers from the institution
to the close of the final process." Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935). See
Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REV. 995, 1048

(1965).

Thus,

§ 2283 bars federal injunctions against state proceedings which have been instituted, but
not those which are merely threatened. Furthermore, it has been noted that § 2283
has been applied only to federal injunctive actions against state criminal proceedings.
U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, LAW ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE

SOuTH 125-26 (1965).
7' See, e.g., Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd mem. 384

U.S. 890 (1966); Wojcik v. Palmer, 318 F.2d 171 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
930 (1963); Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963); Gately v. Sutton, 310 F.2d 107
(10th Cir. 1962); Moss v. Jones, 288 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 868
(1961). Section 2283 has an impact even broader than prohibiting injunctions against
"state proceedings," for as the United States Commission on Civil Rights points out,
"since it is not always possible to anticipate prosecutions of civil rights participants,
intervention by the federal court is foreclosed in many cases." U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS
COMM'N, LAW ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE SOUT
127 (1965).
For the view that § 2283 should not preclude § 1983 injunctive actions against state
court proceedings, see Note, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 92 (1966).
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Thus, in order to avoid the application of section 2283, it has been
argued that section 1983 is an "expressly authorized" exception to
the ban on federal equitable intervention. Although a few courts
have accepted this view,77 most have taken a contrary position.78
These courts reason that since section 1983 provides a general grant
of equity power, it is subject to the more specific limitation imposed
by section 2283. 79 Under this view, section 2283 seems a substantial
limitation on the equitable remedy provided by section 1983.
In addition to Congress's declaration of federal comity in section
2283, the Supreme Court has advanced its own version of comity,
which extends beyond the limits of section 2283. In Douglas v.
8 plaintiff
City of Jeannette,"
Jehovah's Witnesses alleged that
threatened state prosecutions for violations of a municipal ordinance
which prohibited solicitations of orders for merchandise without a
license would infringe their rights of speech and religion, and sought
an injunction on the basis of section 1983. In upholding the denial
of the injunction, the Court stated that federal courts should refuse
"to interfere with or embarrass threatened proceedings in state
courts save in those exceptional cases which call for the interposition
of a court of equity to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and
77See Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 1950); cf. United States
v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 779 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962); Morrison
v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958).
71 See, e.g., Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd mem. 384
U.S. 890 (1966); Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963); Smith v. Village of Lansing, 241 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1957); Sexton v. Barry, 233 F.2d 220 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 870 (1956); Alesna v. Rice, 172 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1949) (dictum); Chaffee v.
Johnson, 229 F. Supp. 445 (S.D. Miss. 1964), aff'd 352 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 956 (1966); Island S.S. Lines, Inc. v. Glennon, 178 F. Supp. 292 (D.
Mass. 1959); U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, LAw ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTEcrION IN THE SOUTH 126 (1965); Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 995, 1050-51 (1965).
71 In Baines v. City of Danville, supra note 78, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, in denying an injunction against state criminal proceedings, explained
its view of § 1983 in the context of § 2283 as follows: Section 1983 "creates a federal
cause of action, but with no suggestion, explicit or implicit, that appropriate relief
shall include an injunction which another Act of Congress forbids. . . . [E]quitable
remedies are authorized, but only by a general jurisdictional grant. Creation of a
general equity jurisdiction is in no sense antipathetic to statutory or judicially recognized limitations upon its exercise." Id. at 589. Thus, the court asserted that there
was "no incompatability between a generally created equity jurisdiction and particularized limitations which restrict" such jurisdiction. Ibid. In fact, "if every grant of
general equity jurisdiction created an exception to the anti-injunction statute, the
statute would be meaningless." Ibid.
80319 U.S. 157 (1943), 11 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 230.
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imminent... ."I". To justify this rule, the Court relied on the congressional policy against federal interference with state proceedings,
as embodied in the predecessor of section 2283.82 Later, in Stefanelli
v. Minard,3 the Court expounded further the rationale for judiciallydeclared federal comity. In Stefanelli, plaintiffs sought to enjoin
under section 1983 the presentation of evidence by state policemen
in a state trial, alleging that the evidence had been obtained by
illegal search and seizure. The Court sustained the denial of the
injunction on the basis of federal comity, announcing that the primary purpose of the doctrine was to ensure that federal courts "respect the proper balance between the States and the federal government in law enforcement."8 4 Furthermore, the Court noted that if
federal courts adopted the practice of frequent intervention into
state law enforcement, "every question of procedural due process of
law-with its far flung and undefined range-would invite a flanking
movement against the system of State courts by resort to the federal
forum .
."85
"..
Such collateral attack on state administration of
justice would expose every "state criminal prosecution to insupportable disruption."8 6
81

Id.at 163.

82Id. at 162-63.
-- 342 U.S. 117 (1951), 24 RocKY MT.L. REV. 374 (1952), 38 VA. L. REv. 514 (1952).
The importance of this case to the doctrine of federal comity in the context of § 1983
is illustrated by the Court's statement of why it decided to hear the case: "Since it
raises important questions touching the Civil Rights Act [§ 1983] in the context of our
federal system we brought the case here." 342 U.S. at 118.
1,342 U.S. at 121. The Supreme Court stated its holding clearly: "We hold that
the federal courts should refuse to intervene in State criminal proceedings to suppress
the use of evidence even when claimed to have been secured by unlawful search and
seizure. The maxim that equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution summarizes
centuries of weighty experience in Anglo-American law. It is impressively reinforced
when not merely .the relations between coordinate courts but between coordinate political authorities are in issue. The special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved
between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law, has been
an historic concern of congressional enactment .... Id. at 120.
s1Id. at 123. The desire to prevent collateral attacks on rulings by state judges
during trials was similarly expressed in Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 401 (1963): An
injunction "should not issue against a state official, at least where . . . there is no
evidence of a purpose to avoid federal requirements and the information has not been
acquired by the state official in violation of a federal court order. Such direct intrusion in state processes does not comport with proper federal-state relationships."
88 342 U.S. at 123. In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court
adhered to the theory of federal comity espoused in Douglas and Stefanelli: "[Tlhe
Court has recognized that federal interference with a State's good faith administration
of its criminal laws is particularly inconsistent with our federal framework." Id. at
484. In Pfister, plaintiffs sought a § 1983 injunction to restrain various state officials
from threatening to prosecute them for alleged violations of Louisiana's subversive
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The Douglas-Stefanelli decisions applied the general principle
of federal comity to law enforcement situations, other than those
defined in section 2288, where there was a danger of inflaming
federal-state relationships. However, neither decision dealt with the
question whether comity prohibited section 1983 injunctive relief
against state officials performing duties besides law enforcement.81
Nevertheless, the sweeping language of Stefanelli could be viewed as
suggesting comity as a second inner circle of limitation on section
1983 relief. Thus, the general contours of liability of section 1983
have been delineated: the phrase "under color of" specifies which
persons may be possible defendants to section 1983 claims; the doctrine of official immunity denies damages where their recovery would
inhibit official decision-making; and the rule of federal comity restrains injunctive relief if there is a danger of upsetting the working
balance between the state and federal governments.
TiE IMPACT OF MONROE V. PAPE88

Throughout the decade following Tenney and Stefanelli, lower
federal courts applied the Screws-Tenney-Stefanelli interpretation
in determining liability under section 1983.89 In the process, the
broad scope of the remedy, as stated by the enacting legislators, was
judicially restricted. Indeed, few state officials were found liable
activities law, asserting that their federal right to freedom of expression was being
abridged. Applying the Douglas-Stefanelli formulation of the doctrine of federal comity, the Pfister Court ordered the district court to enjoin the state officials, deciding
that the facts showed a danger of "irreparable injury." The Court found first that
the "sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression" demanded that immediate
relief be given when a state statute regulating it, such as the Louisiana act, was overbroad. Otherwise, irreparable injury could result from "the fact of the prosecution,
unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure." Id. at 487. Secondly, when state
officials threaten prosecution with no good faith intent of taking the case to trial, the
purpose being instead to intimidate plaintiffs in the exercise of their rights, irreparable
injury is "dear and imminent," for there is no opportunity for judicial review to
correct possible deprivations of federal rights. In order to provide a remedy, injunctive relief under § 1983 was available in this situation. Thus, the Pfister decision
strengthened the original limitation of "irreparable injury" on the doctrine of comity,
without modifying the doctrine itself. Subsequent to Pfister, the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the decision of a Mississippi federal district court for reconsideration in light of the Pfister decision. Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965) (per

curiam).
See notes 129, 208 infra.
-365 U.S. 167 (1961), 1961 DuKE L.J. 452, 12 MERCER L. REv. 410 (1961); see
Sperber, Monroe v. Pape: Redress Under the Civil Rights Act Redefined, 21 LAw IN
TRANSrriON 197 (1961); The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40, 211-16
(1961).
I' See cases cited notes 168, 183, 227 infra and accompanying text.
87
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because of the rather narrow view of the scope of rights protected
by the statute,9 0 because the doctrine of immunity was expanded to
officials ranging from governors to plumbing inspectors, 91 and because
the concept of federal comity as defined in Stefanelli was widely
applied. 92 However, in Monroe v. Pape, 3 the Supreme Court resuscitated section 1983 as a viable civil remedy. In Monroe, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant policemen had broken into their
home and had searched it without a warrant, in violation of their
freedom from illegal search and seizure as protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, and that as policemen, they had
acted "under color of" the laws and ordinances of the city of Chicago
and the State of Illinois. In reversing the lower federal court's dismissal, the Supreme Court held that a claim for damages had been
stated against the policemen, but not against the city of Chicago.9 4
Even though official immunity was not mentioned in Monroe, the
obvious result seemed to be that policemen, to whom some lower federal courts after Tenney had on occasion implicitly extended im00 The chief restriction on the type of violation which would give rise to a § 1983
cause of action was the requirement that the defendant have an intention to deprive
another of federal rights before he could be found liable. See Hoffman v. Halden, 268
F.2d 280, 292-94 (9th Cir. 1959), overruled, Cohen v. Norris, 800 F.2d 24, 29-30 (9th
Cir. 1962); Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1954). This restriction was applied
to all fourteenth amendment violations, even though it originated as a requirement
for proof of deprivation of equal protection only. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S.
1, 8 (1944). See generally Note, Civil Rights Act Section 1983: Abuses by Law Enforcement Officers, 36 IND. L.J. 317 (1961); Note, The ProperScope of the Civil Rights
Acts, 66 HAv. L. REv. 1285 (1953).
91 For a listing of state officials who have claimed immunity as a defense to suits
based on § 1983, see Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers
Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. Rav. 277, 310 n.166 (1965); Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1229, 1233-40 (1955); Comment,
42 U.S.C. §1983-Civil Remedy-Its Circumvention and Emasculation, 12 How. L.J.
285, 290-92 (1966).
02 Federal courts have been especially reluctant to interfere with state criminal
proceedings. As a former Assistant Attorney General of the United States has written,
"In the entire course of our federal legal history, there has been but a handful of
occasions where a federal court enjoined a state from prosecuting criminal charges
for any reason. . . . Only once has a federal court issued an injunction to prevent
MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RPGHVS
"
unadorned abuse of police power ....
53-54 (1964).
3 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see note 88 supra.
"In relieving the City of Chicago of liability, Mr. Justice Douglas noted the
explicit rejection of a suggested amendment to the Act of April 20, 1871, which would
have made municipalities liable if a judgment was returned unsatisfied against the
defendant government officials. He felt this rejection was a persuasive indicium that
the enacting Congress did not intend for municipalities to fall within the scope of
the statutory phrase "every person." 365 U.S. at 191-92. For the text of the rejected
amendment, see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1871) [covering 1833-1873].
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munity,95 would no longer be able to invoke the defense. 0 This
consequence increased the potential usefulness of the statute, particularly since police officers are a major source of alleged section

1983 violations. 97 Monroe also revitalized section 1983 by holding
that "the federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy," 8
thereby negating the defense of exhaustion of state remedies. However, perhaps the greatest impact of the Monroe ruling was the
broadening of the scope of rights encompassed by section 1983. As
Mr. Justice Douglas read the legislative history of section 1983, the
statute was passed to provide a federal remedy against those state

officials who deprived others of rights by failing to enforce state laws
properly. 99 Consistent with his reading, he found that no purpose to
deny rights to others need be proved against defendants to show a
95 See, e.g., Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959); Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446
(7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955); Miles v. Armstrong, 207 F.2d 284
(7th Cir. 1953). Cases such as these often provided a practical immunity for police
officers by holding that the police action complained of was not violative of federal
rights. Thus, many lower federal courts were somewhat dismayed by the Monroe
decision. See Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1961).
9OMonroe's implicit denial of the immunity defense did not mean, as was made
clear by the Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), notes 281-90 infra
and accompanying text, -that the law enforcement officials could not avoid liability
by showing that they had enforced the law in good faith and with probable cause.
Id. at 555-57. However, the difference between immunity on the one hand and good
faith-probable cause on the other is this: immunity from suit bars court inquiry ab
initio into the police official's decision, whereas the defense of probable cause and good
faith requires full trial of the circumstances surrounding the decision and a jury
determination of whether the facts reasonably support the official's decision.
07Although many courts have asserted that police violations of § 1983 are not
identical to the torts of assault and battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment, see
e.g., Cole v. Smith, 344 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1965), the tort and the § 1983 offense seem
operationally the same. See Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 975 (1964); Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1961). Therefore,
statistics on torts committed by policemen provide a measure of the need for § 1983
relief. For example, it has been reported that in 1933 alone, there were an estimated
three and one-half million illegal arrests. See Hail, Police and Law in a Democratic
Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 154 (1953). Another indication of the potential number of
§ 1983 claims against law enforcement personnel is shown by statistics for the year
1964. Thus, in 1,658 cities with a total population over 56,807,000, a total of 75,078
(19.8% of all arrests) persons arrested were released without charge, and 44,832 (11.9%)
were acquitted of the offense charged. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AnSTRAcr
OF THE UNITED STATES

151 (87th ed. 1966). It is reasonable to assume that many of these

arrests would support a § 1983 cause of action.
08 365 U.S. at 183; accord, McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
92Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas concluded: "It is abundantly clear
that one reason the legislation [§ 1983] was passed was to afford a federal right in federal
courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state
laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights,
privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied
by the state agencies." 865 U.S. at 180.
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violation of due process. 00 Finally, Mr. Justice Douglas reaffirmed
the Classic-Screws view that the phrase "under color of" meant acting
under pretense of state law,' 0 ' thus rejecting again the defense that
one clothed with state authority, but acting in violation of it, was not
operating "under color of" state law.
By enlarging the scope of rights which could give rise to section
1983 claims, by implicitly denying the defense of immunity to law
enforcement officers, and by holding the federal remedy supplementary to state relief, Monroe enhanced the future utility of the
statute as a guardian of individual federal rights. 10 2 However, by
increasing the likelihood that more section 1983 complaints would be
instituted against all categories of state officials, the Monroe decision
inevitably increased the danger that the valid purposes promoted by
the doctrines of official immunity and federal comity in a section
1983 context might be defeated. 03 Thus, to the extent that section
1983, as interpreted by Monroe, permits greater examination of state
officials for making policy choices deemed incorrect in restrospect, the
confidence and ability of the state to make its own decisions and to
perform its functions independently is lessened. Therefore, federal
courts after Monroe seem to have employed the doctrines of immunity and comity to protect the independent judgment of "discretionary" officials and to strike a meaningful federal-state balance
which will encourage state self-development.
1983
By denominating possible defendants with the phrase "every
person," the enactors of section 1983 created potential liability for
POSSIBLE DEFENDANTS UNDER SECTION

100Mr. Justice Douglas compared § 1983 with its criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C.

§ 242

(1964), which the Court in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), had said
required "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right." Id. at 103; for the
text of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964), see note 38 supra. However, § 1983 lacked the word
"willfully" employed in § 242. Therefore, in Monroe, Mr. Justice Douglas concluded
that "Section [1983] . . .should be read against the background of tort liability that
makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); accord, Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 79-81 (3d Cir. 1965).
101 365 U.S. at 187. See generally notes 39-40, 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
102 Although Monroe involved a claim for damages only, the decision's broad rendering of the rights protected by § 1983 seems equally applicable in suits for equitable
relief. Thus, since an intention to deprive another of due process no longer need be
proved, the probabilities of establishing procedural due process claims against state
officials performing judicial functions apparently will increase.
103
See notes 49-55 supra and accompanying text for the treatment of the doctrine of
official immunity; see notes 73, 81-86 supra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the purpose of federal comity.
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all persons who allegedly deprive others of federal rights "under
color of" state law. However, the judicial implementation of the
statute has not achieved this result. Frequently, the determinative
factor of liability hinges on only one facet of a particular requirement, such as the "state action" issue embodied in the "under color
of" limitation.0
For example, federal officers, who escape liability
under section 1983 when performing their duties pursuant to a
federal law, 10 5 will nevertheless be considered to act "under color
of any statute ... of any State" when assisting a state officer in the
enforcement of a state enactment. 06 Indeed, a plethora of such distinctions must be scrutinized in determining liability under section
1983. In considering the requirements for liability, attention shall
be directed initially to private persons as potential defendants.
PrivatePersons
The "under color of" language of section 1983 poses the greatest
obstacle to an imposition of liability upon private persons. Since
1o

105

See note 7 supra and accompanying text.

Federal officers found not liable under § 1983 because they were acting under
federal law include congressional committee investigators, Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
U.S. 647 (1963); the Deputy Attorney General of the United States, the First Assistant
to the Assistant Attorney General, the Chief Executive of the Office of United States
Marshals, and a Deputy United States Marshal, United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872
(5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 97 (1965), and Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d
855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965); agents of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Sheridan v. Williams, 333 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1964); federal prison
officials, Walker v. Blackwell, 360 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1966); and state agencies acting under
federal law, Sigue v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 354 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1965) (per
curiam). It has been held, however, that the District of Columbia is considered a
"state" under the language of § 1983. Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
1O In Dombrowski v. Burbank, 358 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (per curiam), the
argument was made that a United States Senator and the chief counsel for a senate
committee had acted "under color of" state law by conspiring with state officials to
violate plaintiffs' federal rights. The court held that, even assuming this to be true,
the federal officials would be entitled to legislative immunity. Id. at 824. The Supreme
Court affirmed the granting of immunity to the Senator, but held the committee counsel
had acted outside the scope of his duties. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82
(1967); note 130 infra and accompanying text. Although the court did not address
itself to the collusion argument, it seems logical that federal officials not entitled to
immunity could be held liable under § 1983 for assisting in the enforcement of a state
law.
Even though the court did not explicitly so state, Burbank impiles that a federal
officer who acts under state law retains his official capacity, instead of becoming a private
person, for purposes of asserting the defenses of immunity and comity to a § 1983 claim.
Thus, the court ruled that the legislative officials could not have performed the acts
which allegedly denied the federal rights of plaintiffs-issuing a subpoena for the documents once they were in the custody of the Louisiana officials-if they had been acting
in a private capacity. Therefore, the court considered them to have acted as legislative officials, and allowed them the defense of immunity. 358 F.2d at 826.
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this language was included in the statute in order to satisfy the
"state action" requirement of the fourteenth amendment, private
persons cannot be found liable unless their personal acts are sufficiently connected with "state action" to fulfill the "under color of"
107
criterion.
Generally, in suits against private persons, the requirement of
sufficient connection with state authority demanded by the phrase
"under color of" is not met. The existence of state laws and judicial
machinery may provide the vehicle by which private persons are
able to deprive others of federal rights. Nevertheless, in such instances, no liability has been found because the state is not considered to have taken an affirmative act which would create an appearance of state authority in the private person. 08 For instance, private
individuals who institute legal proceedings in courts provided by the
state do not act "under color of" state law, even if by doing so they
allegedly violate the federal rights of others. 10 9 Similarly, private
107 Until the criterion of "under color of" is satisfied, there can be no consideration
of the defenses of official immunity or federal comity. Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855
(5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 880 U.S. 981 (1965); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280,
298-301 (9th Cir. 1959), overruled on other grounds, Cohen v. Narris, 800 F.2d 24 (9th
Cir. 1962). Furthermore, if private persons were deemed to have acted "under color
of" state law, the immunity defense would not be available to them, for the underlying
policies protected by immunity are not abridged unless a public official is involved.
However, federal comity might restrain the issuance of an injunction against private
persons in the limited situation where they were about to testify in state court proceedings. Cf. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
108 See cases cited notes 109-14 infra and accompanying text. The courts of appeals
appear firmly to uphold the conclusion that the state must in some manner give
the defendant the appearance of state authority before § 1983's "under color of"
language is satisfied. Few cases have discussed Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
or Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 180 (1964), in conjunction with § 1983 claims. In these
cases, the Supreme Court ruled that the state's enforcement-through its police force
or its courts-of private decisions to discriminate would constitute "state action." Although both cases may be read more narrowly, an expansive reading might cast doubt
on many of the cases which hold actions of private persons not to be "under color
of" state law. However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has distinguished
Shelley in a § 1983 claim to enjoin a private civil action on the theory that before a
state court decides the case, no state action is involved. Stevens v. Frick, 372 F.2d 378
(2d Cir. 1967).
200 See, e.g., Kamsler v. M.F.I. Corp., 859 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1966) (creditor threatened to sue to collect a debt); Harris v. Turner, 829 F.2d 918 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 907 (1964) (father sues to gain custody of child from mother); Kinney v. Johnson, 319 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam) (wife swore out warrant against husband); Skolnick v. Martin, 317 F.2d 855 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 908 (1968)
(defendant required plaintiff, a paraplegic, to sit for four hours in a straight chair
while taking his deposition); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 815 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1968) (suit
to enjoin the further administration of an estate). The State's furnishing a judicial
forum is deemed insufficient state action in the § 1983 context. See Stevens v. Frick,

766

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1967:741

attorneys, in defending clients in criminal proceedings or represent-

ing parties to a civil suit, are not acting "under color of" state law,
even though they are considered officers of the court. 110 Furthermore, public officials are not "under color of" state authority if they
deprive others of federal rights while acting in a private capacity."'
The application of the "under color of" phrase to corporations
and private voluntary associations, which are viewed as "persons"
in the context of section 1983,112 provides additional examples of

lack of sufficient connection with state authority. The fact that
corporations are granted charters by states does not provide a
sufficient appearance of state authority to make them potential
defendants under section 1983."1
The granting of a corporate
charter is generally deemed a neutral, perfunctory action by the state.
Furthermore, where a state has taken no affirmative action to promote
racial segregation in restaurants, a private restaurant which operates
on a segregated basis is not considered to function "under color of"
state law."14
supra note 108; Skolnick v. Spolar, 317 F.2d 857 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 904
(1963).
110Meier v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 356 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 875 (1966); Schroeder v. Illinois, 354 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966); Byrne v. Kysar, 347 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 913 (1966); Harris v. Turner, supra note 109; Skolnick v. Martin, supra note
109; Sarelas v. Porikos, 320 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 985 (1964);
Cooper
v. Wilson, 309 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1962).
11
See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945); note 45 supra and accompanying text. In Duzynski v. Nosal, 324 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1963), a clerk of court
signed a petition for commitment of the plaintiff to a mental institution. However, no
legally-imposed duty required him to sign as clerk. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held him not liable because he was deemed to have signed in
a private capacity. See, in addition, Byrne v. Kysar, supra note 110; Joyce v. Ferrazzi,
323 F.2d 931 (Ist Cir. 1963).
12 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1964): "In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless
the context indicates otherwise ... the words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies,
as well as individuals ....
Neither the language nor the legislative history of § 1983
indicates that "person" as used therein had a meaning different from that spelled out
in I U.S.C. § 1 (1964). See, e.g., Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360
F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1966); Williams v. Howard Johnson's Inc., 323 F.2d 102 (4th
Cir. 1963).
113 E.g., Rosee v. Board of Trade, 311 F.2d 524 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806
(1963); see Saier v. State Bar, 293 F.2d 756 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 947 (1961).
Mr. Justice Douglas has argued, however, that the granting of a corporate charter
or license would be sufficient "state action" to satisfy both the fourteenth amendment
and the "under color of" language of § 1983. See Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267,
274 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
121 Williams v. Howard Johnson's Inc., 323 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1963); see Williams
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In certain instances, however, the actions of private persons, including corporations and private associations,115 will have sufficient
state connection so that the private person will be deemed to have
acted "under color of" state law. For example, where a private hospital obtained the financial assistance of the state, the actions of the
hospital in depriving its employees of federal rights were considered
to be "under color of" state law." 6 Furthermore, United States v.
Price' 7 provides a recent example of the manner in which the acts
of private persons may be brought within the outer circle governed
by the "under color of" phrase. In Price an action based on the
criminal counterpart of section 1983118 was brought against a sheriff
and several private citizens, who had acted jointly with him in depriving the victim of life without due process.- 19 The Supreme
Court, in reversing a dismissal of the prosecution against the private
persons, 120 held that private persons who are "willful participant[s]
v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 293 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 925 (1962).
In the Howard Johnson decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found
that evidence that the Virginia Supreme Court had held there was no state policy
of segregation in restaurants was sufficient to show a lack of "state action." Of course,
under the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243,
42 U.S.C. § 2000 (a) (1964), the decision would have been different. Furthermore, the
Howard Johnson result may be questioned on the theory that a long-standing popular
custom of restaurant segregation would fall within the provision of § 1983 relating to
custom, or usage of any state." Cf. Lombard v.
a deprivation "under color of any .
Louisiana, supra note 113.
xx,For cases involving § 1983 claims against individuals, see Wallach v. Cannon,
357 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1966); Cole v. Smith, 344 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1965); Winkler v.
Pringle, 324 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 908 (1964); notes 109-11
supra and accompanying text.
For cases brought against corporations and voluntary associations, see Kamsler v.
M.F.I. Corp., 359 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1966); Locum v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 354 F.2d 51
(5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966); Kamsler v. Chicago Am.Pub. Co.,
352 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1965); Seeley v. Brotherhood of Painters, 308 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.
1962); notes 113-14 supra and accompanying text.
118Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F2d 577 (7th Cir. 1966); Cf.
Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964). The holdings in these cases rest on a
theory similar to that in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722
(1961).
117 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
118 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964); see note 38 supra for the text of this statute.
119 The murder was the product of a plot whereby the sheriff released the victims
from custody, and subsequently, with the help of defendants (private citizens), intercepted and murdered them. 383 U.S. at 790. See Marland v. Heyse, 315 F.2d 312 (10th
Cir. 1963), for an example of a case in which joint action was not sufficient to impose
liability under § 1983.
120The sheriff was convicted in the district court and did not appeal. 383 U.S. at
792-93.
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in joint activity, with the state or its agents" are deemed to have
12 1
acted "under color of" law.

Although Price tends to expand the outer circle of potential
defendants by including private persons engaged in joint activity
with state officials, it seems unlikely that private persons will be held
liable with any degree of frequency. Few private acts upon which
section 1983 complaints are based are deemed to have sufficient state
connection. 1 22 Indeed, in order to satisfy the "under color of"
requirement, lower federal courts are likely to demand a showing of
both a strong state connection, such as "wilful" participation, and
a substantial need for the relief sought under section 1983.123 Such
12 1 The Price Court concluded that "private persons, jointly engaged with state
officials in the prohibited action, are acting 'under color' of law for the purposes of the
statute. To act 'under color' of law does not require that the accused be an officer of
the state. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity, with the
state or its agents." 383 U.S. at 794. In United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68 (6th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
upheld the conviction of a private citizen who had induced three innocent and unknowing police officers to perform acts which constituted violations of federal rights
of another. Because the court relied on construction of the peculiar language
of § 242 for its decision, the case is distinguishable from a similar case which might
have been brought under § 1983. However, Lester does illustrate the ease by which
.the phrase "under color of" may be read to include private persons. For instance,
it seems possible that a private person who signs a warrant for the arrest of another
in bad faith might be deemed to have acted "under color" for purposes of § 1983,
even though there was no joint plan between him and the police.
The outermost extension of "state action" to encompass private persons is found in
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). Six private individuals were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964) with conspiring to deny Negroes of their right to equal
access to state-owned facilities "by causing the arrest of Negroes by means of false
reports that such Negroes had committed criminal acts." Id. at 747-48 n.l. In reversing a dismissal of the complaint for further hearings, the Court asserted that proof
of "active connivance by agents of the State in the making of 'false reports'" might
be shown, which would satisfy the state action requirement. Id. at 756. However,
a majority of the members of the Court believed that § 241 could be the basis for a
conviction of private individuals even if there were no state connivance in the conspiracy. Their theory was that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment empowered Congress
to enforce the equal protection clause-regardless of whether there was any state action
-if state-owned facilities were involved. Id. at 762, 777-81. For a discussion of § 241,
see Feuerstein, Civil Rights Crimes and the Federal Power to Punish Private Individuals for Interference with Federally Secured Rights, 19 VAND. L. REv. 641 (1966).
122
A survey of cases since the Monroe decision reveals that only one out of seventeen cases brought against private persons under § 1983 has been successful. See Smith
v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966).
123 When an injunction under § 1983 is sought, the plaintiff must show evidence
of harm or potential harm amounting to irreparable injury. Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text; see Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), note 86 supra. Recovery of damages under § 1983 requires the same proof of harm as is necessary in ordinary tort cases. For a discussion
of the applicable tort rules, see PRossFR, TORTS § 30 (3d ed. 1964).
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a result is consistent with the view that the fourteenth amendment,
which section 1983 purports to enforce, should not negative state
authority by applying federal sanctions directly against private persons.

124

Legislators
There is little doubt that state legislators sued under section
1983 are acting "under color of" state law when performing their
legislative duties. Therefore, the chief determinant of section 1983
liability is whether or not legislators are within the inner circles of
official immunity or of federal comity. Democratic opponents of the
Third Enforcement Act recognized that the language "every person" was broad enough to encompass state legislators within the
outer circle of "under color of" state law and strongly objected to
their potential liability.125 Although the Democrats did not mention

the doctrine of official immunity, they employed the doctrine's traditional justification in opposing legislative liability: "liability would
be utterly destructive of the freedom of thought and action that are
indispensable to the proper discharge of legislative duties."' 26 Republican proponents of the 1871 Act did not respond to this criticism.
Eighty years later in Tenney, the Supreme Court acknowledged
the validity of the Democrats' objections and ruled that official immunity did extend to legislators as "discretionary" officials when sued
for damages under section

1983.127

Subsequent federal court cases

have been consistent with the Tenney decision,128 as well as with
124 See note 71 supra and accompanying text.

125 Senator Thurman of Ohio found the possible liability of legislators under the
predecessor of § 1983 particularly disturbing: "[I]f the legislators of a State pass a law
which, in the judgment of some person, deprives him of some right ....and a district
judge ... should be of the same opinion .... where is the clause that exempts those

legislators from the action that is provided for in [the predecessor of § 1983] ... ?
[B]y the terms of this bill, unlimited as they are, every legislator who votes for such a
law is liable to be sued in a district court .... ." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
app. 217 (1871) [covering 1833-1873]. See, e.g., id.at 365-68 (remarks of Representative12Arthur).
0Id. at app. 217 (remarks of Senator Thurman).
127

See notes 59-66 supra and accompanying text.

123 Since the Monroe decision, only two cases brought against legislators under
§ 1983 have sought damages. In Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), the Supreme
Court dismissed a claim against a congressional committee investigator on the theory
that he was acting under federal law and therefore not amenable to suit under § 1983.
Id. at 650. Furthermore, the Court found that "no general statute making federal
officers liable for acts committed 'under color,' but in violation, of their federal
authority has been passed." Id. at 652. However, the Court noted in dictum that
the immunity defense would have been applicable had he been acting within the
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Stefanelli, which broadly stated the rule of federal comity. 129 Thus,
in the recent case of Dombrowski v. Eastland,13 0 plaintiffs alleged

that defendants, a United States Senator and the chief counsel of a
Senate subcommittee, had acted "under color of" state law by

colluding with Louisiana officials in illegally searching plaintiffs'
offices and seizing their documents.1 3 ' The Supreme Court affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint against the defendant Senator on the
basis of legislative immunity, stating that "it is the purpose ... of
legislative immunity . . . that legislators engaged 'in the sphere of
legitimate legislative activity' ... should be protected not only from
the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden

of defending themselves."'

32

However, as regards the complaint

scope of his duties. Id. at 651. The second suit in which damages were sought is
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), discussed in notes 130-34 infra and accompanying text. Both cases also involved prayers for injunctive relief, which were denied.
See note 132 infra.
220 For a discussion of federal comity and the Stefanelli decision, see notes 83-86
supra and accompanying text.
In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), and Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d
597 (4th Cir. 1963), injunctions were granted. In both cases, state legislators were sued
under § 1983 for violations of federal rights by harassing plaintiffs, various civil rights
organizations, with threats of prosecution. The Jordan court explained the formula
which it applied to determine whether to issue injunctive relief against state legislators:
"When the court does act under the fourteenth amendment, it must weigh the state's interest ... against the interest of the citizen in his constitutional rights. Only if the
state's interest is overriding and compelling will the courts condone an invasion of those
rights for which the plaintiffs here seek relief." 323 F.2d at 600. As explained in
Pfister, see note 86 supra, intentional harassment to deprive citizens of rights before
trial will override the presumption, based on respect for a federal-state balance, that
"state courts and prosecutors will observe constitutional limitations as expounded by
this Court, and that the mere possibility of erroneous initial application of constitutional standards will usually not amount to irreparable injury" which would justify
injunctive relief. 380 U.S. at 484-85
130 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (per curiam).
131The Court evidently assumed that the defendant federal officers would fall
within the statutory criterion of acting "under color of" state law if they were shown
to have actually colluded with the Louisiana officials in carrying out the illegal
search and seizure. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
132 387 U.S. at 84. The Court found that the doctrine of legislative immunity had
its roots in the "speech and debate" clause of the Constitution (U.S. CoNsr. art. 1,
§ 6, cl. 2), as explained in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) and Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
Plaintiffs in Eastland sought injunctive relief as well as damages. However, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to issue an injunction against the
defendants because it could not be enforced effectively against them to prevent harm
to the plaintiffs. Thus, the court reasoned that the committee itself, which would not
be bound by the injunctive order, could continue to withhold planitiffs' documents.
Furthermore, the court was attempting to maintain the principle of separation of
powers among coordinate branches of the federal government, an approach analogous
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against the subcommittee counsel, the Court remanded the case for

trial. While acknowledging the applicability of immunity to legislative employees, the Court asserted that the doctrine provided a
greater degree of protection for the legislators themselves than for
employees of the legislative body.1 33 Therefore, the Court deemed
the evidence sufficient to withstand the defendant subcommittee
13 4
counsel's motion for summary judgment.
The extension of the inner circles of immunity and comity to
legislators sued under section 1983 seems highly desirable. Since
there is little question that legislators are "discretionary" officials, the
reasons supporting immunity in the traditional sense of protecting
independent decision-making seem persuasive. Furthermore, the
continuing desire to maintain the self-confidence of state governments, of which state legislators are the chief law-makers, is given

expression by the application of federal comity.

Moreover, as few

violations of federal rights result from the actions of legislators, 135 the
to the doctrine of comity. Dombrowski v. Burbank, 358 F.2d 821, 824 (D.C. Cir.

1966).
118 387 U.S. at 85.
23' "There is controverted evidence in the record, such as the date appearing on
certain documents which respondents' evidence disputes as a typographical error,
which affords more than merely colorable substance to petitioners' assertions as to
[W]e believe that, against an emrespondent Sourwine [subcommittee counsel] ....
ployee of the committee, this showing is sufficient to entitle petitioners to go to trial."
Id. at 84.
18r Since Monroe increased the scope of rights protected by § 1983, only five suits
against state legislators alleging individual harm have reached the federal appellate
level. See notes 128-29 supra; cf. Ivey v. Frost, 346 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1965). This
represents the smallest number of § 1983 cases brought against any of the categories
of state officials considered in this comment.
Of course, by the enactment of an unconstitutional state law, state legislators may
theoretically infringe the federal rights of a great number of persons. Malapportionment of state legislatures is an example. However, this comment does not deal with
the cumulative rights of an entire population. Instead, whenever the number of
federal rights violated is mentioned, reference is to individual personal rights which
may be deprived by the "tortious" actions of state officials directed expressly at the
individual plaintiff. This distinction may be justified on the theory that when the
rights of a large segment of the population are affected, the political process offers an
adequate remedy, and on the ground that § 1983 historically has been a tool for the
vindication of individual federal rights.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that § 1983 has been the basis for several of
the historic reapportionment cases. See Roman v. Sinock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis
v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). These decisions
resulted in injunctions and other equitable relief against various state officials in an
effort to remedy the denial of equal protection caused by malapportionment. In
these cases the Court did not discuss the elements of a § 1983 claim. However, it could
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importance of maintaining full legislative freedom of discussion
would appear to outweigh greatly the competing need to provide
redress for violations of federal rights.
City Councils, School Boards, and Their Members3 6
Multi-member councils and boards which make and administer
local state regulations have many of the characteristics of state legislatures. Like legislators, members of boards and councils are clearly
acting "under color of" state law when executing their "discretionary" duties. Therefore, the chief question in determining their
liability in damages under section 1983 is whether the inner circle
created by official immunity encompasses members of boards and
councils. 37 When an injunction is sought, the inquiry is whether
federal comity extends its protection to the typical functions of
88
boards and councils.'
Prior to the Monroe decision, the doctrine of immunity as it
relates to section 1983 suits against members of boards and councils
was articulated by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Cobb
v. City of Malden. 39 The defendants in Cobb-the mayor and
members of the board of aldermen-were acting as legislators in
preventing the appropriation of funds to pay the salaries of plaintiff
teachers. In response to a charge that plaintiffs had thus been debe said that the Court found "irreparable injury," based on the fact that no other
mode of relief-political or judicial-was available against malapportionment.
138 For purposes of this comment, state election and civil service boards, city councils,
school boards, and their members have been grouped together. They occupy similar
positions in the hierarchy of governmental organizations, all being midway between
state officials charged with making overall state policy and local sheriffs and policemen.
Furthermore, all make their decisions as groups, with no one individual member having
power independent of the group. Finally, the same rules for determining liability
under § 1983 apply with equal force to each of these state organizations.
In ordinary tort suits, these officials are accorded a qualified privilege from damages
suits if they execute their duties in good faith. See PROSSER, Tons § 126 (3d ed. 1964).
137 Senator Thurman, a Democratic opponent of the Third Enforcement Act, made
the sole reference in the legislative history to the possible liability in damages of a
group which falls within the category of boards and councils: "[I]f any school directors
should provide schools for the colored children separate from the whites and not
allow them to mix together, that would be, in [Senator Sumner's] ... opinion, a deprivation of the right of the colored child." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 217
(1871) [covering 1833-1873]. The Senator's remarks were intended to show the allegedly
unwarranted breadth of the statute in a time when schools were for the most part
privately operated. However, his statement takes on added significance today, when
many schools are administered by the states.
188 See notes 72 supra and 153 infra.

281202 F.2d 701 (Ist Cir. 1953) (Magruder, J., concurring).
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prived of property without due process, the defendants were found
to have "a qualified privilege, giving them a defense against civil
liability for harm caused by acts done by them in good faith in the
performance of their official duty as they understood it."l' 40 Monroe
effectively removed the "qualified privilege" by rejecting the rule
that an intention to deprive others of rights was necessary to establish
a section 1988 due process claim .

41

However, lower federal courts

subsequently adopted a new criterion which diminished the harshness of a literal application of section 1983 to boards and councils.
This newly created standard, applicable in suits for either damages
or injunction, could appropriately be called the rule of reasonable
discretion: 42 if the particular board-council decision rationally relates to a valid administrative purpose and outweighs the need for
civil redress provided by section 1988, the decision is said to have
143
been made with "reasonable discretion," and no liability results.

The rule of reasonable discretion, the application of which
depends upon an evaluation of the circumstances surrounding a
14 0

Id. at 707. To be held liable, the defendants must have "realized they were
subjecting plaintiff to harm." Ibid. This statement suggests that the "qualified
privilege" of boards and councils depended ultimately on the absence of an intention
to deprive others of federal rights.
131 See notes 99-lOD supra and accompanying text. The recent case of Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), seems to add further indicia that good faith alone is not
enough. Thus, Pierson held that "good faith and probable cause" was a sufficient
defense against a § 1983 complaint. See notes 281-90 infra and accompanying text.
142 See, e.g., Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir.
1966); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003
(1967); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Mosher v. Beirne, 357 F.2d 638
(8th Cir. 1966); Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1965); Hopkins v. Wasson, 329
F.2d 67 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 854 (1964); Daly v. Stratton, 326 F.2d 340 (7th
Cir. 1964). Lower federal courts have not denominated their treatment of cases against
boards and councils as resting on a rule of reasonable discretion. That label is employed herein because it is most descriptive of the test which the courts seem to apply.
1,4The rule of reasonable discretion as applied to damage suits under § 1983 against
boards and councils seems identical to the standard used to determine whether an injunction based on § 1983 should issue against these state officials. Just as the standard
for winning damages has been relaxed in the case of councils and boards, so has the
Douglas-Stefanelli formula for injunctive relief. See notes 80-86 supra and accompanying text. Therefore, less clear and convincing evidence of irreparable injury is necessary to overcome the presumption in favor of maintaining the federal-state balance.
One reason the standard for federal injunctive relief is relaxed when boards and
councils are sued is their lower rank in the governmental hierarchy. Thus, there seems
less danger of inflaming the federal-state balance when they are enjoined. In any
event, when either injunctions or damages are sought, the lower federal courts seem
to be applying a rule of reasonable discretion to determine liability. Therefore, in
treating recent developments, suits for both kinds of § 1983 relief will be considered
together.
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particular decision, has been employed in cases arising in four areas
of board-council activity. In the area of regulation-making-the most
truly legislative of all board-council functions-liability under section
1983 will not attach where the board-council decision promotes a
valid administrative interest, notwithstanding the alleged infringement of a federal right. For example, a school board policy forbidding the wearing of "freedom buttons" was upheld against a section 1983 claim for injunctive relief, despite the fact that the policy
might have inhibited freedom of expression. 1 44 In that case, however, evidence that "freedom buttons" caused disturbances in the
school and undermined the school routine demonstrated a valid
administrative justification. In a similar case where no such evidence
was introduced, the court enjoined the enforcement of the ban on
"freedom buttons."' 45
A second area of board-council functions involves personnel selection and removal. Although the theory is well established that there
is no right to public employment, 46 damages and injunctive relief
based on section 1983 may be obtained if the board or council fails to
renew an employment contract or removes a person from office without exercising "reasonable discretion."' 47 Generally, removal or
failure to renew contracts will be deemed unreasonable if the reason
for dismissal is not rationally related to the purposes which the board
or council may validly pursue. Thus, removal because of the exercise of a valid right while not engaged in functions related to employ144Blackwell v. Issaquena Co. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
14Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); cf. Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d 114
(5th Cir. 1964).
4 6
'
E.g., Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (dicta); Johnson
v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967); Jenson v.
Olson, 353 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1965). The theory that there is no right to public employment is subject to many qualifications today. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Slochower v. Board of Higher
Educ., supra; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). For an interesting article
suggesting that government largesse, of which public employment is a part, is becoming
the "property" of today, see Reich, The New Property, 73 YArX. L.J. 732 (1964).
17 See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966) (damages found);
Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966) (injunction against board
granted); Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966)
(court order against board issued); Branford v. School Dist. No. 20, 364 F.2d 185
(4th Cir. 1966) (injunction denied); Johnson v. Branch, supra note 146 (injunction
and damages granted); Jenson v. Olson, supra note 146 (damages denied); Hopkins v.
Wasson, 329 F.2d 67 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 854 (1964) (damages denied).
Section 1983 is not available as a means for plenary review of the dismissal on the
merits. See Frazier v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 363 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1966).
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ment has been held unreasonable and arbitrary. 148 However, if the
board or council demonstrates that the person removed from office
had actually disrupted the valid programs and policies of the board
while exercising his right during employment, the removal will be
149
deemed an exercise of "reasonable discretion."'
The issuance of business licenses is a third board-council function
which may result in liability under section 1983 if the exercise of
discretion in refusing the license is unreasonable. For example, a
board which allegedly has not followed due process standards in
conducting a licensing hearing will be said to have acted unreasonably in denying the particular license application.5 0 A final category
of board functions involves admissions of persons to schools. When
the basis of a section 1983 claim in this area is racial discrimination,
courts are quick to issue injunctions. Again the theory is that decisions resting on unconstitutional factors are not generally rationally
5
connected to any valid administrative purpose.' '
The replacement of both the "qualified privilege" and a strict
view of federal comity with a rule of reasonable discretion as the test
to determine section 1983 liability for boards and councils has produced a significant change. On the one hand, if a defendant board
or council could avail itself of either immunity or comity, the court
would dismiss the section 1983 claim before examining the process
of board-council decision-making. In this situation, knowledge that
18

E.g., Johnson v. Branch, supra note 147 at 181-82. The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit found in Johnson that the defendant school board had not
renewed the employment contract of an otherwise qualified teacher primarily because
she had participated in demonstrations for Negro equality. Dismissal "without a
procedure calculated to determine whether legitimate grounds do exist" is unreasonable. Birnbaum v. Trussell, supra note 147, at 678.
4
9Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 1965). In Jenson the plaintiff had
criticized the state agency and its administrators, for which he worked. In dismissing
his § 1983 suit against these defendants, the court said that although plaintiff possessed
the first amendment right of freedom of speech, that gave him no right to disrupt
and reduce department efficiency with impunity. Therefore, his removal from office
was "reasonable."
"o See, e.g., Azar v. Allen, 336 F.2d 1022 (5th. Cir. 1964); Hornsby v. Allen, 326
F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964); cf. Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962). For
cases in which the denial of business licenses was effected with "reasonable discretion,"
see, e.g., Wallach v. City of Pagedale, 359 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1966); Mosher v. Beirne,
357 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1966); Daly v. Stratton, 326 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1964).
l See, e.g., Hightower v. McFarland, 355 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1966); Lee v. Hodges,
321 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1963); Oklahoma High School Athletic Ass'n v. Bray, 321 F.2d
269 (10th Cir. 1963); Reed v. Pearson, 306 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1962); Meridith v. Fair,
298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1967: 741

the court would look no further would have a deterrent effect on
persons who might bring suits against officials within the inner circles
of nonliability. On the other hand, under the rule of reasonable
discretion, the court fully examines the basis of the board-council
decision before determining ultimate liability under section 1983.
This approach produces closer and more frequent federal court
surveillance of boards and councils. Nevertheless, the use of the rule
of reasonable discretion in lieu of immunity and comity in the boardcouncil area appears proper when the reasons justifying the two
doctrines in the context of section 1983 are considered. The traditional rationale for official immunity-to protect the independent
judgment of policy-makers-has never appeared convincing when
applied to city councils and school boards, which rank far down the
hierarchy of governmental decision-makers. 152 Also, there is less need
for an extension of comity to board-council functions, for it seems
reasonable that occasional federal suits under a rule positing broad
discretion in the local agencies are unlikely to cause serious federalstate friction. 15
Judges
After the Monroe decision broadened the scope of rights protected
by section 1983,154 suits against state judges-from the state supreme
court level to police magistrate-showed a marked increase1 55 As
officials of a state's judicial system, judges are clearly within the
outer circle of potential defendants delineated by the phrase "under
color of." Therefore, the dispositive question has been whether
judges are within the inner circle of official immunity. 5 6 In every
112 In fact, in most states, boards and councils are not accorded complete insulation
of absolute immunity, but merely a qualified privilege which protects them from suit
if they act in good faith. See PROSSER, TORTS § 126 (3d ed. 1964).
153
The purpose of comity is to mitigate conflicts between the state and federal
governments. See note 73 supra and accompanying text. The greatest friction arises
whenever the federal government interferes with a state function which the state considers essential to its sovereignty and independence. It is widely recognized that a
state's own administration of its laws is such an incident of sovereignty. However, it
seems unlikely that a state would insist that individual federal "tort" suits arising
from the decisions of local city governments or from the removal of a city employee
would be a violation of its sovereignty. Cf. notes 72, 138 supra.
115See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text.
1rA recent count reveals that at least twenty-eight suits against judges based on
§ 1983 have reached the courts of appeals since the Monroe decision in 1961.
'"" Since most alleged violations of federal rights by state judges occur during the
course of trial, both 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) and the doctrine of federal comity
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case, the well-established rule of judicial immunity from damages has
57
been affirmed.1
During the congressional debates over the predecessor of section
1983, judges received more attention than any other state official. 58
Democratic opponents of the Third Enforcement Act critically
pointed to the possible liability of judges under the broad, inclusive
language of section 1983.159 Statements by Republican sponsors redescribed in Douglas and Stefanelli clearly apply. See notes 73-86 supra and accom-

panying text. Therefore, few § 1983 claims for injunctive relief are brought against
judges. See MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL Ricnrs 53 (1964). In view of this fact,
no further discussion of federal comity as applied to judges appears necessary. Cases
in which federal comity has protected judges and other court officials from injunction
include Stevens v. Frick, 371 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1967); Hall v. New York, 359 F.2d 26 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 879 (1966); Corsican Prods. v. Pitchess, 338 F.2d 441
(9th Cir. 1964); Wood v. Vaughan, 321 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1963); Wojcik v. Palmer, 318
F.2d 171 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930 (1963); Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257
(3d Cir. 1963); Gately v. Sutton, 310 F.2d 107 (10th Cir. 1962); Dronet v. Tucker, 300
F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1962).
157
See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 886 U.S. 547 (1967); Carmack v. Gibson, 363 F.2d 862
(5th Cir. 1966); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021
(1967) (dicta); Gabbard v. Rose, 359 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1966); Haldane v. Chagnon,
45 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965); Arnold v. Bostick, 339 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 858 (1965); Harman v. Superior Court, 329 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1964); Sires v.
Cole, 820 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1963); Gately v. Sutton, 310 F.2d 107 (10th Cir. 1962);
Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959); Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782 (8th Cir.
1955); Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1953). Spires v. Bottorff, 317 F.2d 273
(7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 938 (1964), is the only recent case in which a
judge has been held liable in damages under § 1983. However, the court affirmed rather
than rejected the rule of judicial immunity. Liability rested on the fact that the
judge had acted "with clear absence of" jurisdiction by inducing a prison official to
prevent plaintiff from corresponding with the clerk of the court concerning his appeal.
Therefore, the judge had not met the requisite of judicial immunity that he be acting
"within the scope of his duties." See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
"Is See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 366 (1871) [covering 1833-1873] (remarks of Representative Arthur); id. at 385 (remarks of Representative Lewis); id. at
486 (remarks of Representative Cook); id. at app. 185 (remarks of Representative
Platt); id. at app. 216-17 (remarks of Senator Thurman); id. at app. 276-77 (remarks
of Representative Porter).
15D Democratic Representative Arthur stated: "Hitherto, in all the history of this
country, and of England, no judge or court has been held liable, civilly or criminally
for judicial acts ....
Under the provisions of [§ 1983's progenitor] . . . every judge
in the State court and every other officer thereof.., will enter upon and pursue the call
of official duty with the sword of Damocles suspended over him by a silken thread...."
Id. at 366. According to Democratic Representative Lewis, "by the [predecessor of
§ 1983] . . . the judge of a State court, though acting under oath of office, is made
liable to a suit in the Federal court and subjected to damages for his decision against
a suiter, however honest and conscientious that decision may be." Id. at app. 385.
Senator Thurman expressed the Democratic criticism in the interrogative form:
"Is the old maxim of the law, that a judge for any judgment he gives can only be
liable to impeachment, to be reversed and that judge dragged to a Federal court to
be mulcted in damages if the Federal judge, no wiser than he, under no higher obligation to obey the Constitution than he, shall be of a different opinion?" Id. at app.
217.
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garding the failure of state courts in the South to provide equal
justice were calculated to show the need for a federal remedy. 10
Thus, they offered no direct rebuttal to specific Democratic criticism.
Nevertheless, Republican explanations of section 1983's predecessor
furnish some inferential support for judicial immunity. Representative Porter, who favored the bill, felt that it would not reach-and
was not intended to reach-the "outrages committed under the forms
of law, and especially in the courts of the States ... ."'" Although

he did not specify whether perjured testimony, biased juries, or the
judges themselves were responsible for the "legalized outrages,"10 2 it
is reasonable to assume that Representative Porter felt that the actions
of state judges were a significant factor.163 Therefore, a plausible
10 Representative Platt gave the Republican view of justice in the South: "It has
been a well-recognized . . . fact, that no Republican, white or black, especially if he
is a citizen who has come here from another state or is at all prominent, can secure
as plaintiff or defendant anything like equal justice before the courts of the
State ...." Id. at app. 185. See, e.g., id.at 334 (remarks of Representative Hoar); id.
at 604-05 (remarks of Senator Pool); id.at app. 78 (remarks of Representative Perry); id.
at app. 277 (remarks of Representative Porter); id.at app. 312 (remarks of Representative Burchard); notes 11, 15, and 16 supra and accompanying text.
161 1d. at 276-77. Thus, Representative Porter stated: "[T]here is yet another class
of outrages which [the predecessor of § 1983] ... does not reach, and it does not reach
at all, and is not intended to reach. I refer to the outrages committed under the
forms of law, and especially in the courts of the States which are in the hands of the
Democratic party .... I would like to see a bill pass that would reach not only the
Ku Klux outrages, but the other outrages, the legalized outrages ....
" Ibid.
162According to Representative Stoughton, who presented to the House the report
of the Senate investigating committee on conditions in the South, one of the main evils
of the Ku Klux Klan was "that it not only binds its members to execute decrees of
crime, but protects them against conviction and punishment, first by disguises and
secrecy, and second by perjury, if necessary, upon the witness-stand and in the jurybox." Id. at 320. Representative Hoar stressed the failure of southern juries to return impartial verdicts: "If the jurors of South Carolina constantly and as a rule
refuse to do justice between man and man where the rights of a particular class of its
citizens are concerned, and that State affords by its legislation no remedy . .. " then
the state has deprived that class of equal protection of the laws. Id. at 334; see
id. at app. 78 (remarks of Representative Perry).
163 Several of Representative Porter's Republican colleagues offered the opinion that
judges were a contributing cause of the breakdown of justice in the South. Representative Perry pointed out that "where these gangs of [Ku Klux Klan] assassins show
themselves . . . judges having ears to hear, hear not . . . In the presence of these
gangs all the apparatus and machinery of civil government, all the processes of justice,
skulk as if government and justice were crimes and feared detection." Id. at app. 74.
Republican Representative Sheldon explained the breakdown on the theory that
judges in the South bad fallen victim "to a mania which sometimes seizes hold of the
popular mind." Id. at 368. According to Senator Osborn, "[I]f the state courts had
proven themselves competent to suppress the local disorders, or to maintain law and
order," Congress would not have had to legislate on this subject. Id. at 653. Representative Platt offered a specific example of a judge's denying equal justice and char-
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explanation of why he thought the progenitor of section 1983 did not
reach the "legalized outrages" is that state judges who allowed such
"outrages" 'to occur were protected from liability by judicial immunity.164
These Republican statements were not specifically noted by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Picking v. Pennsylvania
R.R.,105 the first case to consider judicial immunity as a defense to
a section 1983 claim for damages. Instead, the court found that
"Congress by enacting the Civil Rights Act sub judice intended to
abrogate the privilege [of judicial immunity] to the extent indicated
by the act and in fact did so. '166 However, when the Supreme Court
in Tenney ruled that state legislators were immune from section
1988 suits, 16 7 lower federal courts were quick to find a close analogy
between legislative and judicial immunity based on the traditional
notion that independence of judgment should be protected."' Inacterized the judges as "little kings, with almost despotic powers to carry out the

partisan demands of the legislature which enacted them." Id. at app. 186.
164

Another proponent of the Third Enforcement Act, Representative Cook, added

a further indicium that the statute was not intended to abrogate judicial immunity.
In answer to a question as to whether the refusal of a state court to certify the record
of a case to the Supreme Court would be a basis for liability, he answered:
"MR. COOK: If an attempt has been made to prevent a record being certified...
by force, intimidation, or threat, it would have been an act which the national Government might prohibit by law ....
"MR. ELDRIDGE: The state officers in the case I mention not only threatened not to
do the act, but refused to do it, and did not do it.
"MR. COOK: But they acted judicially; they did not propose to deprive a citizen of
his right by violence. There was no force, intimidation, or threat." Id. at 486. Thus,
according to Representative Cook, state officials would not be liable under the predecessor of § 1983 if they "acted judicially."
16' 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947); notes 56-57 supra
and accompanying text. Picking was subsequently discredited by the Supreme Court's
decision in Tenney, see note 68 supra and accompanying text, and finally overruled
by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1021 (1967).
10 151 F.2d at 250.
167 See notes 59-66 supra and accompanying text.
168In the first post-Tenney case involving judicial immunity, the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit held the doctrine to be a defense in § 1983 claims against judges,
in spite of the Picking precedent. Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809, 811 (1st Cir. 1953).
Two years later, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed, stating that the
construction of § 1983 so as not to abrogate judicial immunity was "based on sound
considerations of public policy and practical necessity." Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782,
786 (8th Cir. 1955). Adopting the reasoning of Tenney, the court said: "The general
language employed in the Civil Rights Act does not evidence a clear congressional
intent to impair the long standing rule of judicial immunity." Ibid. This same view
prevailed in the lower federal courts after the Monroe decision in 1961. Thus, in the
words of Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624, 629-30 (D. Neb.), afJ'd, 309 F.2d 959
(8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963), "an examination of all federal
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Ray,"0

the Supreme Court
deed, in the recent case of Pierson v.
reasoned that the doctrine of judicial immunity was as firmly established as immunity for legislators and dismissed a section 1983
damages claim on that basis. 70° In Pierson, the defendant, a municipal police judge, had convicted plaintiffs, Negro and white
clergymen, under a Mississippi breach of the peace statute which they
allegedly violated by seeking to use a segregated bus station. 171 When
the statute was later held unconstitutional as applied to a similar
factual situation, 172 plaintiffs brought a damage suit under section
1983 against the judge and the arresting police officers, 78 claiming their arrest and conviction under the invalidated law was
a deprivation of due process "under color of" state law. Without
examining the process of judicial decision-making leading to the
convictions, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant judge was
absolutely immune from damages under section 1983.174 Writing for
the Court, Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated that the public interest
in "principled and fearless decision-making" by the judiciary required the protection of official immunity, especially when judges
have to decide "controversial cases which arouse the most intense
feelings in litigants."'17 Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed the
Tenney interpretation that Congress, by adopting section 1983, had
not intended to abolish common law immunities. Thus, the Chief
cases which have cited Monroe v. Pape reveals that it has not yet been considered for
its effect, if arty, on the well-established rule of judicial immunity." For listings of
decisions which have upheld judicial immunity, see Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964); note 157 supra.
...
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
170 Id. at 554.
:71 The clergymen's convictions under the Mississippi breach of the peace law were
remanded for a new trial on appeal from the municipal police judge. At the second
trial, a directed verdict was entered for the clergymen because of insufficient evidence.
Id. at 550.
1 See Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965) (per curiam), in which the
Supreme Court reversed convictions of "Freedom Riders" who had tried to use segregated bus facilities. The Pierson majority discussed the Thomas case in 386 U.S. at 550
n.4.
n.8
The Supreme Court's treatment of the liability of the police
officers in Pierson
is discussed in notes 281-90 infra and accompanying text.
31$86
U.S. at 554. Mr. Justice Douglas, the only dissenter, urged the Court to adopt
a more limited immunity for judges, exempting "judges from liability for the consequences of their honest mistakes," id. at 566, but not from liability "for the knowing
and intentional deprivation of a person's civil rights." Ibid. He based his view
on his belief that "every person" [in the text of § 1983] meant "every person, not
every7 5 person except judges." Id. at 559.
Id. at 554.
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Justice noted that "Congress would have specifically so provided
had it wished to abolish the doctrine."'176 Therefore, common law
immunity remains available to insulate judges completely from damages under section 1983.177
The broad acceptance of judicial immunity appears to be consistent with the doctrine's traditional justification, for the role which
the judge plays in government demands a high degree of impartiality
and independence from outside pressures if equal justice before the
law is to be attained. Moreover, by raising them above the level of
ordinary tort liability for their official acts, immunity helps to promote public respect for judicial officials, and therefore, for the law
itself.
State Prosecutors
The decision to include the functions of state prosecutors within
the inner circles of immunity178 and comity 179 in section 1983 suits
has been based on the similarities between judges and state prosecutors. Both judges and prosecutors unquestionably act "under color
170 Ibid.

'1In some cases, judges have avoided liability under § 1983 without the aid of
the doctrine of official immunity. For instance, judges sued under § 1983 have been
found not liable if there was no deprivation of federal rights caused by the judge.
See, e.g., Harris v. Turner, 329 F.2d 918 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 907 (1964);
Sires v. Cole, 814 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 847 (1963); Abernathy v.
Patterson, 295 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962). A clear
example of judicial mistake which does not violate a federal right is a "mere error of
judgment." See, e.g., Sarelas v. Sheehan, 326 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1963); Hurlburt v.
Graham, 323 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1963). At least one dismissal of a § 1983 claim against
a judge has been based on the running of the applicable statute of limitations. Minchella v. Estate of Skillman, 356 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385. U.S. 861 (1966).
171The extension of judicial immunity to prosecutors acting within the scope of
their duties has been described as the "practical implementation of judicial immunity."
Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624, 634 (D. Neb.), aff'd, 309 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963).
170Since the duties of state prosecutors are as much a part of the law enforcement process as are those of judges, the doctrine of federal comity applies in the

same manner to their functions when injunctions based on § 1983 are sought.

Therefore, no specific discussion of comity as applied to prosecutors will be attempted. For a listing of cases, see note 156 supra. The doctrine of comity,

especially as it relates to state court proceedings, is discussed at notes 73-86 supra.
Furthermore, although the prohibition found in 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) applies only

to Court proceedings which have been instituted, see note 75 supra, it has been said
that federal courts, under the principle of comity, "will not enjoin a pending or
future state criminal proceeding" MARsHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL [IGHTS 51 (1964).
Under this view, prosecutors would be insulated from injunctive actions under § 1983
in almost every instance. However, there are a few exceptions to this rule. See
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); note 86 supra.
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of" state authority when they execute their duties as outlined by the
state. Qualifying equally as "discretionary" officers of the court, both
are committed to the fair and fearless administration of the state's
judicial system. These similarities, in light of the slight reference to
state prosecutors in the congressional debates of 1871,180 make the
enacting legislators' comments regarding the liability of judges highly
relevant to any inquiry into the potential liability of state prosecutors.1 8
After the Tenney Court adopted the view that section 1983 did
not abrogate legislative immunity, 8 2 the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in Kenney v. Fox, 8 3 held that the inner circle of
official immunity included state prosecutors. Pointing to the similarities between judges and prosecutors, the court enunciated the
general rule that "a prosecuting attorney is a quasi-judicial officer
and enjoys the same immunity from a civil action for damages as that
which protects a judge acting within his jurisdiction ...."134 The
Kenney view was followed by several other circuits. 85 However,

by broadening the scope of violations giving rise to section 1988
complaints, 8 6 the Monroe decision arguably cast doubt upon the
propriety of analogizing immunity for any court official from the
legislative immunity of Tenney. 87 Nevertheless, the initial reac111Senator Thurman, a Democratic opponent of the Third Enforcement Act, mentioned prosecutors in discussing the predecessor of § 1983. To show that there was no
need for a federal civil remedy directed toward state court officials, Senator Thurman
defended the record of state courts in North Carolina: "Now is there any complaint
that these judges will not execute the law? Is there any complaint that these State
attorneys will not execute the law, will not set it in motion? Nothing of that kind ...
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 220 (1871) [covering 1833-1873].
281The previously noted statements of Representatives Porter and Cook provide some
inferential evidence that the sponsors of the Third Enforcement Act did not intend
to abrogate immunity for judges. See notes 161-64 supra and accompanying text.
Therefore, it could be persuasively argued that if the issue of prosecutors' liability
had been discussed, their remarks would have been markedly similar. Additionally,
when the issue of official immunity is considered, the similarities between judges and
prosecutors tend to override the differences, such as the fact that the prosecutor
normally makes decisions outside the glare of publicity.
182 See notes 59-66 supra and accompanying text.
183 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 852 U.S. 855 (1956).
"I Id. at 290.
185
E.g., Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959); Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d
124 (5th Cir. 1955).
116 See notes 99-101 supra and accompanying text.
187Two reasons suggest that Monroe challenged the propriety of immunity for
judicial officers of all types. First, the Court stated the purpose of § 1983 in extremely broad terms, see note 99 supra and accompanying text, indicating that the
need for civil relief for deprivations of civil rights would be considered paramount
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tion of lower federal courts was that immunity would continue to be
available to prosecutors until there was a more explicit decision on
the question by the Supreme Court or an abrogation of immunity
by Congress, 188 a view widely held by the courts of appeal today.189
unless strong reasons for denying recovery were presented. The Court, however, did
not indicate whether official immunity would constitute such a countervailing reason.
Nevertheless, by failing to mention Tenney, the Monroe Court arguably intended to
leave that decision and its doctrine of legislative immunity intact. Secondly, the
Monroe decision raised additional questions regarding immunity for judges and prosecutors in the context of § 1983 in explaining its grant of certiorari: "The case is here...
because of a seeming conflict of that ruling [Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959)]
with our prior cases." 365 U.S. 167, 170 (1961). In Stift, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit had dismissed suits based on § 1983 against judges, prosecutors, and
law enforcement officers. In doing so, the court expressly rejected the argument that
§ 1983 "makes no exceptions for judicial officers, quasi-judicial officers and law-enforcing
officers." 267 F.2d at 239. However, when the Court in Monroe ruled on the question
of police officers' liability, it gave no indication whether it intended the decision to
negate Stift entirely, or merely to correct the Stift court in its application of § 1983
to law enforcement officers.
1 The view that prosecutors were still entitled to official immunity after Monroe
was stated explicitly in Phillips v. Nash, 311 F.2d 513, 516 (7.th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 809 (1963): "We think it will be time enough to say the federal Civil Rights
Act permits any person who has been prosecuted by a State's Attorney or an Assistant
State's Attorney to sue such official under the Civil Rights Act when and if Congress
so determines or when and if the Supreme Court announces an extension of its holding
in Monroe v. Pape."
In some cases, lower federal courts have not had to rely on the doctrine of immunity
to dismiss § 1983 suits against prosecutors. For cases dismissing such suits for failure
of the plaintiff to show that a federal right had been deprived, see, e.g., Egan v.
City of Aurora, 365 U.S. 514 (1961); Williams v. Williams, 363 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.
1966); Smith v. Ellington, 348 F.2d 1021 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 998
(1966); Harris v. Turner, 329 F.2d 918 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 907 (1964);
Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1963). Two cases have been dismissed on procedural grounds: Minchella v. Estate of Skillman, 356 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 861 (1966) (appropriate statute of limitations had run); Sires v. Cole, 314 F.2d
340 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 847 (1963) (no jurisdiction of the subject
matter).
180 E.g., Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967);
Gabbard v. Rose, 359 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1966); Byrne v. Kysar, 347 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1966); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964); Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 867 (1964); Scolnick v. Lefkowitz, 329 F.2d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 825 (1964); Hurlburt v. Graham, 323 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1963); Sires v. Cole, 320
F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1963); Wise v. City of Chicago, 308 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 944 (1962); Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1961).
Bauers v. Heisel, supra, is the most instructive modem case on prosecutor's immunity
in the context of § 1983. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant prosecutor had deprived
him of federal rights by denying him a speedy trial and by prosecuting him while
knowing he was under 18 at the time, in violation of a New Jersey statute. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit invoked the doctrine of immunity to dismiss the
claim against the prosecutor. The court supported its decision on two grounds. First,
applying .the maxim that "a statute should not be considered in derogation of the
common law unless it expressly so states or the result is imperatively required from
the nature of the enactment," id. at 587, the court found that Congress had not in-
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While official immunity for prosecutors in section 1983 suits has
been broadly recognized, lower federal courts in the past have not
rigorously enforced the common law requirement that the official be
acting within the scope of his duties.10 However, the recent trend
has been to investigate whether a defendant prosecutor was acting as
a judicial official before allowing him the defense of immunity.'0 '
This requirement appears reasonable since the rationale for extending immunity to prosecutors involves their similarity to judges, in
that both are "discretionary" officials dedicated to the impartial administration of justice. Thus, in Robichaud v. Ronan,10 2 the plaintended § 1983 to abolish official immunity. Secondly, the court relied on the precept
that if a case may be decided on two grounds, the constitutional one is to be avoided.
The Bauers court feared an interpretation of § 1983 which would raise the constitutional issue of Congress's power to alter the republican form of state government.
("The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of
government ......
U.S. CONsT. art. 4, § 4.) The court reasoned that an interpretation of § 1983 abrogating immunity would destroy the independence of the state judiciary, thereby altering one aspect of a republican form of government.
In adopting the statutory interpretation that § 1983 did not abrogate immunity,
the Bauers court abandoned its earlier construction of the statute and overruled
Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776
(1947), 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 160 (1967). See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
10 Instead of requiring that the state official show that he was acting within the
scope of his duties, the lower federal courts have often accorded immunity to state
officials merely by virtue of the title they held. Thus, if the official was a state
prosecutor, it was assumed that he was a "discretionary" official and that the scope
of his duties for the purposes of immunity encompassed the acts done in the particular
case. It made little difference whether the prosecutor had acted in a judicial capacity
or in some other capacity characteristic of prosecutors. This attitude is best illustrated
in Gaito v. Strauss, 249 F. Supp. 923 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 368 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1966):
"Actually, we deem it unrealistic to so artificially compartmentalize the activities of
a district attorney-particularly the first assistant-so as to say that his activities in
interrogating a suspect are non-privileged while those activities expended in trying the
case . .. are privileged. All such activities should be equally privileged against damage suits." Id. at 931.
191 See, e.g., Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 589-91 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1021 (1967); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965); Corsican Prods. v.
Pitchess, 338 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1964); Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955).
A similar tendency is discernible in suits against prosecutors for injunctive relief.
Thus, the Supreme Court in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), reversed
the denial of an injunction against threatened prosecutions of plaintiffs under § 1983,
while still recognizing the doctrine of comity as applied to judicial proceedings. The
Court ruled that the prosecutions constituted harassments of the plaintiffs in the
exercise of federal rights, producing "irreparable injury," and therefore comity would
not bar relief. However, the decision also announced that had the defendant prosecutor executed his prosecutorial duties in good faith, the injunction would not have
issued. Conceivably, harassment by means of threatened prosecutions is outside the
scope of the prosecutor's duties.
19- 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965).
Robichaud contains an excellent summary of the
traditional reasons for official immunity.
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tiff complained that the defendant county attorneys had confined her
without access to a lawyer to make her confess to a murder. When
the defendants claimed immunity as a defense in the section 1983
suit, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that they had
lost their immunity by acting more as police investigators than as
judicial officers. 19 3 Thus, the court held that immunity would not
extend to prosecutors unless the acts in question were done "in the
94
performance of an integral part of the judicial process."'
The traditional justification for official immunity in the context
of section 1983 seems valid in the case of state prosecutors. 19 5 Since

prosecutors are responsible for distinguishing criminal cases meriting
prosecution and those frivolous in nature,196 their independence of
judgment in making this decision warrants protection. In addition,
fear of federal court interference with the state prosecutor's decision
to enforce certain state laws could produce a potential hesitancy in
him to enforce other state laws. Moreover, such potential yielding
to intimidation might ultimately cause the public to view the prosecutor's decisions as unworthy of respect.
1031d. at 536.
19 Ibid. Two other courts of appeals expressly agree with Robichaud that the
common law immunity requirement that the officer be acting within the scope of his
dudes should be rigorously enforced. In Corsican Prods. v. Pitchess, 888 F.2d 441 (9th
Cir. 1964), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which also decided the
Robichaud case, stated: "[P]rosecutors are not immune from suit under the Act simply
as a matter of status wholly without regard to the nature of their conduct." Id. at
444. In Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 886 U.S. 1021 (1967),
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit pointed out that in order to determine
"the question of whether a prosecuting attorney is liable for acts done in his official
capacity, we must decide whether his duties are sufficiently judicial as to cloak him
with the same immunity afforded judges or are so closely related to those duties of law
enforcement officials as to amerce him with potential civil liability for his imprudent
actions." Id. at 589. Finally, in the relatively early case of Lewis v. Brautigam, 227
F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held a prosecutor
liable on the theory .that "if the State's Attorney ordered and directed the officers to
force the plaintiff to plead guilty, then certainly he is no less liable than are those who
carried out his instructions. It would be wrong to hold the officers liable but the
State's Attorney exempt." Id. at 129.
'Or In Bauers v. Heisel, supra note 194, the court affirmatively recognized the importance of two reasons underlying nonliability for prosecutors: to protect the independent judgment of officials given discretion in the public interest, id. at 588-89, and
to maintain the federal-state balance, id. at 589.
205 Cf. Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1963). The importance of the prosecutor's decisions in determining which cases to prosecute is strongly emphasized in Tm
PIFSIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTIcE,
LENGE OF CRIME IN A Fan SociErY 133-34 (1967).

THE CHAY-
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Minor Court Officers

Minor state court officers, such as clerks of court, bailiffs, and
agents of the court, 19 7 are considered "under color of" state law when
Therefore, their liability under section

they execute their duties.

1983 turns upon whether they are entitled to the benefits of official
immunity or federal comity. This determination unfortunately
cannot be made from the dearth of the enacting legislators' comments regarding potential liability for such minor state court
officials.' 98 Assuming, however, that the Third Enforcement Act was

not intended to extinguish the doctrine of official immunity, an
inquiry into the common law requirements of immunity becomes
relevant. Specifically, "ministerial" officials, as opposed to those who
perform "discretionary" functions were not granted the common law

protection of immunity.1 9 Consequently, lower federal courts have
adopted the states' view that clerks, bailiffs, and other agents of the
court cannot successfully invoke the immunity doctrine when they
have allegedly violated federal rights by exercising the ordinary
powers of their positions. 20 °

Although the exercise of these lawful

117 Persons acting as agents of the court who have been sued under § 1983 include
medical witnesses, and/or medical commissions appointed by the court to submit their
findings, Duzynski v. Nosal, 324 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1963), and state deposition officers,
Sarelas v. Sheehan, 353 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1965). This category of persons who act "under
color of" state law in carrying out a duty given them by the court or in testifying
during a judicial proceeding could include any expert witness named by the court, as
well as arbitrators and special masters appointed by the court. These suggestions are,
however, by no means exhaustive.
298 As is true for many categories of state officials, the legislative history of § 1983
sheds little light on the question of liability of minor court officers. Representative
Arthur, opposing the Third Enforcement Act, pointed out that the predecessor of
§ 1983 was so broad that it would cause every court officer, "great or small," to "enter
upon and pursue the call of official duty with the sword of Damocles suspended over
him by a silken thread ...." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 366 (1871) [covering
1833-1873]. See also note 205 infra.
See generally Davis, Admin199See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text.

istrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 Micu. L. Rav. 201 (1956); Gray, Private Wrongs
of Public Servants, 47 CALF. L. Rav. 303 (1959); Handler and Klein, The Defense of
Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government Executive Officials, 74 HARv. L.
R v. 44 (1960); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: DamageActions, 77 HARv.
L. REv. 209 (1963).
200 See Johnson v. Crumlish, 224 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1963), in which a district
court held liable a clerk of court and numerous other officials for imprisoning plaintiff
for eight days without allowing him to see a judge.
An example of the usual statutory powers of a clerk of court is provided by N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 2-16 (1953); "1. To issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of any

witness residing or being in the State, or to compel the production of any bond or
paper, material to any inquiry pending in his court .... 4. To issue citations and
orders .to show cause to parties in all matters cognizable in his court, and to compel
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powers may necessitate choosing between valid alternatives, minor
court officials do not possess the traditional attributes of "discretionary" officers. 20 1 Therefore, the importance of independence in decision-making by minor court officials is not so substantial as to negate
the interest in providing for civil redress. 202 Furthermore, it would
appear that federal comity should not bar section 1983 injunctive
relief against the exercise of ordinary duties by minor court officials,
since these functions are hardly analogous to those typically protected
by comity.2 03 Moreover, it makes no difference that the minor court
officials exercise of ordinary powers which violates a federal right was
done pursuant to or in violation of his duties.204 In either case, liability is imposed.
Although the doctrines of comity and immunity are usually unavailable to minor state court officials, both defenses may be recognized where the officer allegedly violates federal rights while acting
strictly pursuant to a judicial order.20 5 In this situation, the officer
the appearance of such parties .... 7. To preserve order in his court and to punish
contempts ....

9. To open, vacate, modify, set aside, or enter as of a former time,

decrees or orders of his court, in the same manner of courts of general jurisdiction."
201For a listing of the factors which are often present when courts classify an officer
as "discretionary," see note 52 supra.
202 See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text.
208 State functions typically protected by federal

comity are those which are considered incidents of state sovereignty, such as state court and legislative proceedings.
Few functions performed by minor state court officials rise to the level of these aspects
of state sovereignty.
20See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927); Meyers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915), for cases holding liable various elections
officers for violating federal rights while acting according to the state law. However,
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), seems to have modified this harsh result by holding
that minor officials who enforce a state law only subsequently held unconstitutional
will not be liable if they act in good faith and with probable cause. See notes 281-90
infra. Furthermore, it seems that a good faith standard should be applied if the
clerk's function has a judicial character, such as the power of a North Carolina clerk
"to preserve order and to punish contempts" (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 2-16 (1953)). Thus,
for example, a valid judicial interest in preserving court order would tend to outweigh
the interest in providing redress in many circumstances. However, where the powers,
even if discretionary in some sense, become more perfunctory and "ministerial," the
stricter standard of probable cause should be employed. No state interest in protecting minor clerk discretion in these situations exists to balance against the need for
personal relief.
200 During the congressional debates of 1871, Representative Lewis, an opponent of
the predecessor of § 1983, commented on the possible liability of ministerial officers
while acting upon a judicial order: "[A] ministerial officer is subject to the same pains
and penalties [as judges], though simply executing the process of a State court, about
which he has no discretion, and the legality of which he has no right to question."
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 385 (1871) [covering 1833-1873]; see id. at 366 (remarks of Representative Arthur). The replies of Republican Representatives Cook and
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may successfully assert official immunity or comity as a defense if he
was acting "at the express direction of the judge whose arm and
agent he then was." 20 6 This exception is based on the fact that the
particular officer has no reasonable alternative but to comply with
the judge's order.20 7 He is not the responsible cause of the deprivation of a federal right. Furthermore, disobedience and disloyalty to
his superior, the judge, is discouraged by allowing the minor court
officer the defense of immunity or comity in this situation. Moreover, assertion of either defense by the officer precludes a collateral
attack on the originators of the decision, the judges, who are charged
with making decisions normally protected by either immunity or
comity.
High Executive Officials
State governors and high executive officials at the state "cabinet"
level clearly are acting "under color of" state authority when they
perform their duties on behalf of the state. Once within this outer
circle of potential defendants, ultimate liability for high executive
officials will be determined by whether or not these officers are enPorter to the effect that state court officials might not be liable under the predecessor
of § 1988 give a partial, although inconclusive, answer to the allegations of the Demo-

crats. See notes 161-64 supra and accompanying text.
200 Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601, 604 (9th Cir. 1965). The rule that official immunity may be available to minor court officials who are executing judicial orders
when their act allegedly deprives another of a federal right has been upheld in the
following cases: Clerks: e.g., Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 915 (1964); Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
867 (1964); Sires v. Cole, 314 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 847 (1963);
Carpenter v. Dethmers, 253 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1958). Bailiffs: e.g., Haldane v. Chagnon, supra; Agnew v. Moody, supra. State Deposition Oflicers: e.g., Sarelas v. Sheehan,
353 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1965); Sarelas v. Sheehan, 326 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 932 (1964). Medical Experts: e.g., Duzynski v. Nosal, 324 F.2d 924 (7th Cir.
1963).
Few cases, if any, have considered the issue of injunctive relief against minor
court officials who are enforcing judicial orders. However, it seems reasonable that if
an injunction were sought against the execution of a court order by a minor court
official, federal comity would bar its issuance. Court orders must of necessity be considered state court proceedings, which comity protects in most cases. See notes 73-86
supra and accompanying text. In addition, the reasons which motivate the extension
of immunity to minor court officials who are enforcing court orders also support the
application of .the comity doctrine to the same situation. See text following note 207
infra.7
20 See Haldane v. Chagnon, supra note 206; Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624
(D. Neb.), aff'd, 309 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963). The
minor court official does have the alternative of refusing to comply with the judge's
orders, but the sanction for noncompliance is a citation and conviction for contempt
of court.
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compassed within the inner circles of official immunity and federal
comity. 20 As "discretionary" state officials, state governors were
dearly entitled to immunity from ordinary tort liability while acting
within the scope of their official duties.20 9 However, no reasonable
consensus can be ascertained from the congressional debates over
section 1983 as to whether executive immunity was intended to be
abrogated by the statute. 210 Since the text of section 1983 does not
expressly demand abrogation, it would seem that official immunity
for state executives would be consistent with the maxim that a statute
"should not be considered in derogation of common law unless it
expressly so states or that result is imperatively required from the
nature of the enactment." 211
Just as lower federal courts derived judicial immunity from the
legislative immunity recognized in Tenney, the courts have also
accorded official immunity to high state executives-the third branch
20

s Although no recent decisions have considered the issue, the doctrine of federal
comity ought to be available to prevent frequent federal court injunctions based on
§ 1983 from being issued against state governors. The functions performed by state
governors seem as much incidents of state sovereignty as are state court proceedings.
Thus the embarrassing federal-state conflict-which comity seeks to prevent-is hig4ly
likely if federal courts frequently enjoin the actions of high executive officials. See
generally notes 72, 153 supra.
In order to obtain equitable relief against state governors, a plaintiff must meet

the Douglas-Stefanelli test of irreparable injury. See notes 73-86 supra and accompanying text. As a prime illustration of how irreparable injury might be shown against
high governmental officials, see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); note 86
supra.
20, See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483
(1896); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981
(1965). See generally Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CALiF. L. REv. 303
(1959); Handler and Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against
Government Executive Officials, 74 HAgv. L. REv. 44 (1960); PRossaR, TORTS § 126 (3d
ed. 1964).
21
0 Democratic Representative Arthur was the only Congressman during the debates
to speak directly to the question of the liability of state governors: "[I]f ... the Governor enforces [the law] . . . for a mere error of judgment, [he is] . . . liable." CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong. 1st, Sess. 366 (1871) [covering 1833-1873]. Even though there were
no other direct comments on the issue of the liability of other state executives, Democrats and Republicans did engage in a lively debate concerning the reason for the
failures of Tennessee's Republican governor. Republicans blamed Democratic state
legislators, who "had stripped [the governor] ... of all executive power by repealing
laws that had been passed with the view of giving the Executive power to protect the
citizens of the State." Id. at app. 309 (remarks of Representative Maynard). The
Democrats offered a different explanation: the laws were not faithfully executed "because [the governor] . . . knew, and his party knew, that if these supposed rebel Ku
Klux were caught the majority of them would be found to belong to his own
party .... " Id. at app. 203 (remarks of Representative Garrett).
21 1
Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 587 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021
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However, seldom have courts dismissed

section 1983 damages claims on the basis of official immunity. 213
Nor has comity often been used to dispose of section 1983 injunctive
claims against state executives. 214 Instead, in the few cases brought
against these officials, dismissals have been granted on alternative
grounds: failure to demonstrate that a federal right had been deprived; 21 5 inadequate showing that the particular executive caused
212 The Supreme Court has continually recognized the defense of official immunity
from ordinary tort liability for high executive officials of government since its decision
in Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). As recently as 1959, the Court affirmed and
extended the scope of immunity to executive officials below the "cabinet" level,
stating that executive immunity "is . . . an expression of a policy designed to aid in
the effective functioning of government." Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1959).
Without question, the above reasoning should apply to the use of executive immunity
in the context of § 1983.
The Barr Court expressly approved the oft-quoted rationale for executive immunity
given by Judge Learned Hand in Gregorie v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950): "It does indeed go without saying that an official,
who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any
other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability
for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such
complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for
doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the
case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty,
to the burden of a trial to .the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsbile, in the unflinching discharge of their duties." The Hand rationale of executive immunity has a special
bearing on immunity under § 1983, for in Gregorie, one of the claims against various United States officials-including two Attorney Generals-was based on § 1983.
Although Judge Hand found § 1983 did not apply because the acts were not done
"under color of" state law, it is reasonable to assume that he was aware of the
problem of immunity under the statute and that his remarks were partially in response
to that issue.
212 Only one case since Monroe denies the liability of a high executive official
on
the basis of immunity alone. See Scolnick v. Lefkowitz, 329 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1964). The
early case of Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 776 (1947), held the governor of Pennsylvania liable in damages, but that
decision was first discredited by the result in Tenney and subsequently overruled
by the Court of Appeals for'the Third Circuit itself in Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581
(3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967); see note 182 supra.
21 The Supreme Court acknowledged the availability of federal comity as a defense
to § 1983 injunctive claims against high executive officials in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965). However, in that case, "irreparable injury" was also found, thereby
making the doctrine of comity inapplicable. See also Abernathy v. Patterson, 295 F.2d
452 (5th Cir. 1961).
215E.g., Ream v. Handley, 359 F.2d 728 (7th Cir. 1966); Smith v. Ellington, 348 F.2d
1021 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 998 (1966); Poole v. Barnette, 336 F.2d 267
(5th Cir. 1964); Powell v. Work Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1964);
Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Simon, 299 F.2d 212

(2d Cir. 1962).
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216

the infringement;
the reasonableness of the executive's policy
decision, notwithstanding the alleged infringement of a right; 217 and
the invocation of the federal abstention doctrine. 218 It should be
noted, however, that the utilization of these alternative grounds for
dismissal appears to indicate a reluctance on the part of the courts to
entertain section 1983 claims against high executive officials in the
first instance, rather than any unwillingness to extend official im219
munity to such officers.
The reasons underlying both immunity and comity are especially
convincing in the case of high executive officials. Specifically, independence of decision-making for state executives, who are responsible for the daily operation of state government, is essential if
the "effective functioning of government" is to be secure.220 Further,
federal-state friction at the highest executive level of state government
may be avoided by the application of comity, resulting in a smoother
working balance between the federal government and the states. 221
Prison Wardens, Mental Hospital Superintendents,and Their Supervisory Boards

After Monroe enhanced the utility of section 1983 as a remedy
for redressing denials of federal rights,

222

there was a marked increase

in suits against state prison wardens, mental hospital superintendents,
and the supervisory boards of such state institutions.2

23

Unquestion-

216 E.g., Joyce v. Ferrazzi, 829 F.2d 931 (Ist Cir. 1963); Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d
110 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975 (1964).
217 E.g., Labat v. McKeithen, 361 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1966). When the decision by the
high executive is found to be a reasonable one, lower federal courts generally hold
that there was no actual violation of a federal right. Therefore, a cause of action
under § 1988 is not stated.
218 See Abernathy v. Patterson, 295 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 986 (1962). Federal abstention is an aspect of the doctrine of federal comity.
Thus, federal courts may, in their discretion, abstain from considering certain cases
if there is a possibility that a narrowing construction of a state law by state courts
would make it possible for the federal courts to avoid a constitutional question. See
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 812 U.S. 496 (1941). For recent limitations on the
doctrine of abstention, see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Comment, 1965
DuxE L.J. 102; note 86 supra.
219The Supreme Court's decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), seems to
support the conclusion that official immunity would be available to all officials who
were entitled to it at common law.
220 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1959).
221 See note 208 supra and accompanying text.

,222 See notes 99-101 supra and accompanying text.
223 Since the Monroe decision in 1961, at least thirty-three cases brought against
either prison wardens, mental hospital superintendents, or persons associated with
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ably, state institution administrators act "under color of" state law
when executing their state-imposed duties. Therefore, relief under
section 1983 has turned chiefly upon whether or not these state

officials could successfully rely on either the doctrine of immunity or
upon the rule of federal comity.
Unfortunately, the congressional debates over the progenitor ot

section 1983 are barren of references to prison wardens, hospital
superintendents, or their governing boards.

Furthermore, no state

official discussed by the Congress of 1871 has duties sufficiently similar
to those of state administrators to permit a meaningful analogy, such
224
Regardless,
as the one drawn between judges and prosecutors.

after the Supreme Court in Tenney held that section 1983 did not
eliminate the doctrine of official immunity,228 lower federal courts
extended the inner circle of protection to include state institution
220
administrators, if they were acting as state jailors or custodians.
22 7
the
In the first case so to extend immunity, Francis v. Lyman,
defectives,
for
mental
farm
state
of
a
defendant, the superintendent
had allegedly kept the plaintiff confined illegally, thereby depriving

him of liberty without due process. 228 In holding the superintendent
not liable in damages under section 1983, the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit announced that official immunity was available as

a defense if the detention, even though it infringed federal rights,
these state institutions have reached the Courts of Appeals. See cases cited notes 230,
240-46 infra.
224 See note 177 supra and accompanying text.
225 See notes 59-66 supra and accompanying text.
226 Few suits, if any, have been brought under § 1983 seeking an injunction
against the institution administrator from detaining a plaintiff. However, it seems
reasonable that if a plaintiff sought to enjoin a prison administrator from enforcing
a court order of detention, comity would prevent issuance of the injunction. The
detention order could easily be viewed as an aspect of "state court proceedings," protected from injunction by 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). See notes 73-79 supra and
accompanying text. See also note 231 infra.
227 216 F.2d 583 (st Cir. 1954).
228In Lyman, suit was brought under § 1983 against a state judge, members of the
state commission of correction, and state parole board members, in addition to the
superintendent of the state farm. The plaintiff alleged that his federal rights were
violated because the judicial commitment order was made without giving him
sufficient notice of a hearing or an opportunity to be heard. However, the court dismissed the complaint against the judge on the basis of judicial immunity. Francis v.
Crafts, 203 F.2d 809 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 835 (1953). Dismissal of the
compaint of illegal detention against the commissioners of correction and members
of the parole board was based on the theory that they had no authority to inquire
into the judicial order, and therefore had not caused any deprivation of federal rights.
216 F.2d at 584-86.
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was effected pursuant to a court order. 229 Since the superintendent
had no power to challenge the commitment order, he could not
reasonably be held liable for obeying it.230 In detaining the plaintiff,
the superintendent had merely acted as state custodian, and as such
his protection from liability for confining a person was derived from
judicial immunity itself.231

Subsequent cases have consistently fol-

lowed the Lyman rule that state institution administrators are free
from section 1988 liability when they detain persons under court
2
order.,
In addition to detention under court order, another common
circumstance which gives rise to section 1983 claims against state in2 33
stitution administrators is their treatment of prisoners and patients.
The earlier view was that state prison wardens and hospital superintendents were insulated from all section 1983 actions concerning
treatment because the federal courts refused to oversee state prisons.234
In recent years, however, federal courts have evolved a rule of reasonable discretion, 2 5 similar to the rule used to determine the liability
220 Id. at 588.
Accord, e.g., Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959), overruled on
other grounds, Cohen v. Norris, 800 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962); Kenney v. Fox, 282 F.2d
288 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 855 (1956); Dunn v. Gazzola, 216 F.2d
709 (lst Cir. 1954); Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624 (D. Neb.), aff'd, 809 F.2d 959
(8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 872 U.S. 909 (1963).
231216 F.2d at 588-89. If a federal court were to order a state institution administrator to release the plaintiff, .this action would amount to a collateral attack on a state
court judgment. Such an attack based on § 1983 was expressly disapproved by the
Supreme Court in Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), notes 85-86 supra and
accompanying text, on the basis of the doctrine of federal comity.
282E.g., Joyce v. Ferrazzi, 323 F.2d 981 (1st Cir. 1963); Nesmith v. Alford, 318
F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975 (1964); Hoffman v. Halden, 268
F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959), overruled on other grounds, Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24
(9th Cir. 1962); Dunn v. Gazzola, 216 F.2d 709 (1st Cir. 1954); Rhodes v. Houston, 202
F. Supp. 624 (D. Neb.), af'd, 809 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909
(1963). The reason for immunizing state institution administrators from liability when
acting as state custodians is similar to the rationale for the immunity of minor court
officials who execute court orders. See notes 205-07 supra and accompanying text.
33 The care and treatment of prisoners and mental patients was deemed a "ministerial" act by the common law. Therefore, immunity was not available as a protection from suits for damages. See FROSsER, TORTS § 126 (3d ed. 1964).
2" Thus, the rule of federal comity was utilized to prevent either the recovery of
damages or injunctions against state institution administrators. For judicial treatment
of this aspect of federal comity, see, e.g., Cole v. Smith, 344 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Ragan, 337 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965);
Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963); Rhodes
v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624 (D. Neb.), aff'd, 309 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963).
253See, e.g., Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 -(4th Cir. "1966); Jobson v. Henne, 355
F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966); Williford v. California, 352 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1965); Richey v.
2 80
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6

of local boards and councils.23 Thus, if the particular treatment
promotes a valid administrative interest-usually prison disciplinewhich outweighs the competing interest in redressing infringements
of colorable rights, discretion is said to have been reasonably exercised
and no liability will be found. To resolve the issue of "reasonableness," federal courts evaluate the circumstances surrounding the particular administrative decision. Thus, in Jobson v. Henne,237 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied a rule of reasonable
discretion to a state mental hospital director when the complaint
involved treatment accorded the plaintiff patient. 238 In holding the
director liable in damages, the court determined that the need to
have a patient earn income to finance his own treatment was not

a reasonable justification for imposing unusually long working hours
239
on the patient, in violation of due process.
The rule of reasonable discretion has been most frequently
applied when prison or hospital treatment infringes "fundamental"
rights. Thus, where the "preferred freedoms" of the first amendment
are involved, the necessity for a particular regulation to the proper
functioning of the hospital or prison must be considerable in order

Wilkins, 335 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1964); Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961);
Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961). Federal courts of appeals have not
generally denominated the test utilized to determine the liability of prison-hospital
administrators as a "rule of reasonable discretion." However, it seems appropriatc
so to name the test, for it seeks to protect administrators if they have reasonably exercised their state-authorized discretion.
The rule of reasonable discretion as applied to state institution administrators
is derived basically from the rule of federal comity. Just as the Douglas-Stefanelli
requirement for injunctive relief was relaxed in the case of local boards and councils,
see notes 142-43 supra and accompanying text, so it has been relaxed with respect to
institution administrators. Although the courts give no reason for such a change, it
seems that the greater probability of violations of federal rights at the hands of
prison-hospital administrators, coupled with the unlikely prospects of judicial review
of their policies and programs by the state courts, has necessitated greater federal
court inquiry into prison-hospital treatment of inmates. Compare Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), note 90 supra. The rule of reasonable discretion is
better adapted to such inquiry than is either the doctrine of immunity or the principle
of federal comity. Furthermore, treatment of patients and prisoners does not seem to
be the kind of function normally considered as an incident of state sovereignty.
Therefore federal-state friction is less probable.
238See notes 142-43 supra and accompanying text.
2 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966).
238 The court in Jobson acknowledged that state mental hospital directors may use
the defense of official immunity in some instances, but stated that the doctrine "should
be sparingly applied in suits brought under § 1983" alleging unconstitutional treatment
of patients or prisoners. Id. at 133-34.
289

Id. at 131-32.
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to establish the reasonableness of the regulation. 240 For example,
a prison rule or punishment which infringes freedom of religion will
is
generally be held "unreasonable, ' 241 unless compelling evidence 242
discipline.
maintain
presented that such restrictions are essential to
Likewise, rules which restrict prisoners' communication by mail with
the courts and lawyers are often found to be "unreasonable" because
they act as unnecessary restrictions on the prisoners' rights to judicial
review. 243 Conversely, regulations of prisoner mail with other per210 Cases in which the administrative interest of the state institution has been found
to outweigh the importance of providing redress under the particular circumstances
include Labat v. McKeithen, 361 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1966); Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d
502 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 966 (1966); United States ex rel. Lee v. Illinois,
343 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1965); Gaito v. Prasse, 312 F.2d 169 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 816 (1963); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
862 (1961). Other cases have declared that the importance of protecting the federal
right infringed outweighed the administrative interest to be served by the rule or
policy which violated the right. E.g., Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966);
Williford v. California, 352 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1965); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196
(4th Cir. 1961). See generally Note, ConstitutionalRights of Prisoners:The Developing
Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962).
241 E.g., Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam); Williford v. California,
supra note 240; Richey v. Wilkins, 335 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1964); Pierce v. La Vallee, 293
F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Sewell v. Pegelow, supra note 240. But cf. Sostre v. McGinnis,
334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
22 In Pierce v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1963) (per curiam), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 918 (1964), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to issue an
injunction against defendant prison officials who had allegedly punished plaintiffs for
studying the Black Muslim religion. The Court said there was no showing that the
punishment was the result of their religious beliefs; rather, the defendants had attempted to prevent the "agitation" caused by the plaintiffs.
218In DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1966), defendant prison officials were
found liable for confiscating plaintiff prisoner's legal papers, even though they claimed
prison discipline as their justification. The court reasoned as follows: "When the
efforts of a state prisoner to obtain available state appellate review of his conviction
are frustrated by the action of penal officials, there has been a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Reasonable access to the courts, state
and federal, is guaranteed by that clause." Id. at 685. See also Smartt v. Avery, 370
F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967). Federal courts of appeals in Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970
(8th Cir. 1965) and Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 940 (1955), dealt with the issue of prisoner correspondence with the courts, indicating that such communication could not be unduly restricted. However, the facts
in neither case justified a finding that the prison officials had acted "unreasonably"
in promulgating the particular regulation. Cf. Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963); United States ex rel. Hoge v. Bolsinger, 311
F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1962) (per curiam), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 931 (1963).
A related problem involves balancing a prisoner's access to various legal materials
needed to pursue his appeal against the interest in maintaining prison discipline. See,
e.g., Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d 502 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 966 (1966) (damages and injunction denied); Williams v. Wilkins, 315 F.2d 396 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 852 (1963) (injunction denied); Gaito v. Prasse, 312 F.2d 169 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 816 (1963) (injunction denied); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961) (injunction denied).
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sons are often sustained because of the administrative interest in pre244
venting fires which might result from accumulated paper in cells.

Denial of medical treatment may be classified as "unreasonable,"
depending on the circumstances. 245 Finally, liability is frequently
based on an arbitrary denial of equal treatment to prisoners. 246
The basis for sanctioning the use of the doctrine of immunity in
the case of detention of persons by state institution administrators
seems highly desirable when placed in juxtaposition to the reasons
for protecting other state officials from damages under section 1983.
Allowing prison-hospital administrators and their advisory boards to
assert immunity in this situation is supported by two policies: (1) the
person who is not the responsible cause of the violation of federal
rights should not be liable; and (2) obedience to judicial orders
should be promoted. Likewise, employment of the rule of reasonable discretion-instead of the doctrine of comity-when the claim
rests on prisoner-patient treatment appears sound. Although federal
interference in this situation does tend to affect the federal-state
relationship, the danger of federal-state friction-which comity seeks
to prevent-is not substantial, since prison and hospital administrators
do not make decisions affecting the entire state. 247 Moreover, adoption of a rule of reasonable discretion permits the retention of a
large measure of state autonomy in prison-hospital policy-making.
These factors, coupled with the high probability that violations of
"' Labat v. McKeithen, 861 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1966); cf. United States ex tel. Lee
v. Illinois,
343 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1965).
24
E.g., Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1967); Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129
(2d Cir. 1966); Hirons v. Director, Patuxent Institute, 351 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1965).
But see Snow v. Gladden, 338 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1964). However, in Pennsylvania
ex tel. Gatewood v. Hendrick, 368 F.2d 179, 180 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam), the court
stated that improper medical treatment "was not a denial of rights secured by the
federal Constitution or laws."
2
"16E.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th
Cir. 1966); see Snow v. Gladden, supra note 245. However, in Walker v. Pate, 356

F.2d 502 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 966 (1966), the court dismissed a § 1988 claim
alleging that defendant prison official had denied plaintiff the privilege of visiting with
his wife, while such privilege was accorded other prisoners. The court ruled such
discrimination to be within the scope of prison discipline.
2 7 Since their decisions are generally restricted to the particular hospital or prison
for which they have charge, state institution administrators do not affect a broad segment of society. Therefore, a violation of rights resulting from their decisions would
not generally come to the attention of the polity. Thus, since a political resolution
would be unlikely, a judicial remedy is needed. Furthermore, decisions regarding
the treatment of patients and prisoners would not seem to be such important incidents
of state sovereignty as would produce serious federal-state conflict if a degree of federal
review were permitted.
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federal rights will occur frequently in prisons and mental hospitals,
justify the current application of the more flexible test of reasonable
discretion.

Law Enforcement Officers
As the class of state officials most immediately responsible for
enforcing state laws, state and local law enforcement officers must
exercise their authority in a way which frequently results in violations
of federal rights. 24 9 It is not surprising, therefore, that the greatest
number of section 1983 actions have been brought against state law
enforcement officers. 250 From the first time the phrase "under color
of" was defined with specific reference to police officers, 251 they have
been considered within the outer circle of potential defendants to
section 1983 claims. Therefore, prior to the Monroe decision, a key
issue in determining police liability was whether law enforcement
officers were included within the inner circle of the immunity doctrine.2 52 After Monroe implicitly denied immunity to policemen, the
218See note 222 supra and accompanying text. Evidence of the extent of the
violation of the federal rights of prisoners is scant. However, some notion may be
derived by comparing the number of prisoner petitions to federal district courts with
the total number of suits brought in the district courts. Thus in 1965, there were
7,096 prisoner petitions, fully one-ninth of the total petitions to district courts (63,137
total). U.S. BuEuAu OF STATISTCS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNrED STATES 156
(87th ed. 1966).
249The
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice has noted that "there is no profession whose members are more frequently

tempted to misbehave .. . than law enforcement."
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

ADMINISTRATION

THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON

OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A

FaREE SocIFnY 115 (1967). While recognizing that there was no way of estimating the
amount of police misconduct, and therefore potential violations of federal rights, the
Commission reported that it "does have evidence from its own studies and from police
officials themselves, that in some cities a significant percentage of policemen assigned
to high-crime areas do treat citizens with disrespect and, sometimes, abuse them
physically." Ibid. Physical abuse would generally be considered violation of federal
rights protected under § 1983. See Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1961).
For statistics which might indicate the number of potential violations of federal rights
by law enforcement officials, see note 97 supra. See generally Hall, Police and Law
in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133 (1953); Note, Civil Rights Act Section 1983:
Abuses by Law Enforcement Officers, 36 IND. L.J. 317 (1961).

2" A recent count shows that approximately fifty-five cases based on § 1983 have
reached the federal appellate level since the Monroe decision. After excluding
reapportionment cases from the total number of § 1983 suits filed, ciaims against the
police and law enforcement officers accounted for approximately one-fourth of all the
cases. See note 274 infra.
See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); note 45 supra and accompanying
2581
text.

12 Both before and after the Monroe decision, the doctrine of federal comity has
applied to police officers. See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), notes 83-86
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chief question became whether proof of the two requisites of section
1983 would alone be sufficient to recover against police officers, or
whether, in addition, some degree of personal fault on the part of the
25
officer would have to be shown.
Although no proponent addressed himself to the issue, an inductive evaluation of Republican statements regarding the Third Enforcement Act points to the conclusion that those enacting legislators
did not envision that plaintiffs would have to overcome the defense of
official immunity before obtaining redress against law enforcement
officers. In the first instance, it can be inferred from Republican
statements that the predecessor of section 1983 was not designed to
abolish official immunity for judges and court officials. 25 4 Therefore,
if such state officials were not subject to section 1983 liability, the remedy would operate against only a few state officers, unless it did, in
fact, apply to law enforcement officers. This observation gains added
significance when viewed against the fact that the Republicans, attempting to justify the federal remedies of the precursor of section
1983, cited numerous examples of southern sheriffs failing to enforce
the law equally. 255 To the Democratic opponents of the "1871 Act,
supra and accompanying text. However, the strength of the doctrine as a protection
for police officers against injunctions has varied depending on the nature of the
factual situation. Thus, as in Stefanelli, when a police officer is to appear at a state
trial, federal comity will prohibit a federal injunction against his testifying. On the
other hand, it seems unlikely that federal courts would reach the same result if the
plaintiff sought to enjoin law enforcement officials whose actions violate federal rights.
See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 880 U.S. 479 (1965). The distinction seems to be that the
function sought to be prohibited in the former case is typically considered an incident
of state sovereignty; in the latter, the police's action is not so viewed.
Rarely does the question of an injunction against police officers arise, however,
since in most cases, the violation of federal rights has actually occurred before the
§ 1988 complaint is filed. Cases in which § 1983 injunctive relief has been sought
against law enforcement officials include Rigney v. Hendrick, 855 F.2d 710 (3d Cir.
1965); Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 929
(1966); Due v. Tallahassee Theatres, Inc., 333 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1964); Wooten v.
Ohler, 303 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1962).
25"After the two requisites of § 1983 were proved, lower federal courts before
Monroe frequently required plaintiffs to show in addition that the defendant police.
man had had an intent to deprive the plaintiff of his federal rights before he could
recover from the defendant. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 291 (9th
Cir. 1959), overruled, Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962). Intention to de.
prive, however, is not the sole kind of personal fault on the part of police officers which
could have been required before liability would be imposed. For example, the
standard of personal fault to be shown might have been negligence or recklessness.
Therefore, the question dealt with in the second half of this section is whether some
degree of personal fault must be demonstrated before plaintiffs can recover.
2" See notes 161-64 supra and accompanying text.
255 Representative Hoar, speaking in support of the Third Enforcement Act, urged:
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there was no doubt that law enforcement officers could be held liable
under section 1983.256 Nevertheless, they urged the defeat of the
statute because liability would be imposed unjustly in two situations:
where the policeman violates a federal right while properly executing
a judicial order;257 and where he infringes a right as a result of "a
258
mere error of judgment."
After the Tenney decision recognized an inner circle of official
immunity from section 1983 claims, 259 the doctrine was extended to
260
but not by
law enforcement officers by a few federal courts,
261
rectified
clearly
In any event, the resulting confusion was
others.
262
Specifically, although
by the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape.
Monroe did not speak in terms of immunity, by finding liability
against the defendant police officers the Court sub silentio held that
immunity was not available as a defense for law enforcement
officers. 265 Thus, in Cohen v. Norris,264 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit stated: "Monroe v. Pape involved police officers and,
while the opinion of the court does not specifically discuss immunity,
the result reached necessarily implies the rejection of such defenses
is an effectual denial by a State of the equal protection of the laws when any
"lt
class of officers... refuse to extend that protection. If every sheriff in South Carolina
refuses to serve a writ for a colored man and those sheriffs are kept in office year after
year by the people of South Carolina, and no verdict against them for their failure
of duty can be obtained before a South Carolina jury, the State of South Carolina,
through a class of officers who are its representatives to afford the equal protection
of the laws to that class of citizens, has denied that protection." CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1871) [covering 1833-1873]. See, in addition, e.g., id. at 460 (remarks of Representative Coburn); id. at app. 78 (remarks of Representative Perry).
250 Democratic Representative Whitthorne pointed out early in the debate that
under the predecessor of § 1983, "suits may be instituted without regard to amount
or character of claim by any person within the limits of the United States, who conceives that he has been deprived of any right . . . under color of law . . . of any
State. That is to say, that if a police officer in the city of Richmond or New York
should find a drunken negro or white man upon the streets with loaded pistol flourishing it, etc., and by virtue of any ordinance, law, or usage, either of city or State, he
takes it away, ,the officer may be sued, because the right to bear arms is secured by the
and such suit brought in distant and expensive tribunals." Id. at 337.
Constitution,
7
25 Id. at 585 (remarks of Representative Lewis).
8
25 Id. at 365 (remarks of Representative Arthur).
259 See notes 59-66 supra and accompanying text.
280 See Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959); United States ex rel. Atterbury
237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956); Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1954).
v. Ragen,
261
E.g., Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955).
365 U.S. 167 (1961); see note 88 supra.
208See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
2300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
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as a general proposition." 265 Lower federal courts quickly conformed
266
to such an interpretation of the Monroe result.
Several persuasive reasons justify the denial of official immunity
for police officers. First, the traditional reason for granting immunity-to protect the independent judgment of "discretionary"
officials-does not apply because policemen are merely "ministerial"
officers, 267 charged with implementing previously-made policy decisions and enforcing the law. Furthermore, the public interest in
shielding the police officer from liability is slight,268 compared to the
need for a civil remedy against potentially numerous police violations
of federal rights. 26 9 Additionally, denial of immunity to policemen
helps to promote the strong public interest of ensuring respect by
the police for the constitutional rights of the accused. 270 Clearly,
20

Id. at 33. (Emphasis added.)
266See, e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); Basista v. Weir, 340
F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1965) (dictum); Due v. Tallahassee Theatres, Inc., 333 F.2d 630 (5th
Cir. 1964); Sheridan v. Williams, 333 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1964); Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d
536 (10th Cir. 1963); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962); Hardwick v.
Hurley, 289 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1961).
267See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text. At first blush, it would seem that
police and other "ministerial" officers ought not to be held liable, since either they have
no discretion-as when acting under judicial order-and therefore should not be held
responsible; or they do have discretionary duties-even in walking a "beat"-and
therefore are "discretionary" officials. However, the underlying factors which determine
"discretion" are not present when the office of policeman is considered. See Note, 66
HARV. L. Rlv.488, 491-98 (1953); note 52 supra. See generally Davis, Administrative
Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MICH. L. Rav. 201 (1956); Gray, Private Wrongs of Public
Servants, 47 CALF. L. REv. 303 (1959).
208 In fact, it has recently been emphasized that "from the point of view of policecommunity relations, it is extremely important that policemen be held to account for
rudeness and disrespect" toward members of the public. THE PRaSIENI'S CO'M'N ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTicE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE

SocETY 116 (1967).
201See PROSSER, ToRTs § 126 (3d ed. 1964). The need for a federal civil remedy is
demonstrated first by the fact that police violations of federal rights greatly outnumber
the actual infringements of such rights by any other state official. See notes 97, 249-50
supra for statistics on police violations. Secondly, plaintiffs suing state officers for infringement of federal rights are usually more likely to get a fair hearing in federal
court because of the reluctance of state courts to entertain cases against state police
officers. See Note, 36 IND. L.J. 317, 321 (1961). See generally Hall, Police and Law
in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. LJ.133 (1953); Note, 46 COLuM. L. REv. 614 (1946).
27oecent decisions by the Supreme Court emphasize the current judicial concern
that the rights of the accused be respected by police officers. See, e.g., Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (rights of
the accused during police questioning); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(right to counsel when tried for serious crimes); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(freedom from illegal search and seizure). Lower federal courts have implemented this
concern by finding liability against police officers when sued under § 1983. For example,
in Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966), the Court of Appeals for the
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police officers will be more likely to observe those rights if they know
that immunity will not protect them from liability under section
1983.271
Besides its implicit rejection of immunity as a defense for policemen sued under section 1983, the Monroe decision also held that
police liability did not depend on proof of a specific intent to deprive
a person of the federal right to due process. 272 The Monroe Court
stated that section 1983 "should be read against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.

'273

Consequently, a plaintiff suing under sec-

tion 1983 need only prove the two requisites-deprivation of federal
rights "under color of" state law-to state a cause of action against
274
a policeman.
Fourth Circuit, in holding an officer liable, stated: "[T]he police department is
society's instrumentality to maintain law and order, and to be fully effective it must
have public confidence and cooperation." Id. at 204. This can be accomplished only
if police employ their enforcement measures according to law. Therefore, "law obby the police cannot be divorced from law enforcement." Ibid.
servance
2
73-Lower federal courts have offered further justifications based on public policy
for denying police officers the defense of immunity in § 1983 suits. Thus, in York
v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 99 (1964), the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said that security of federal rights from police violations
is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 455. In addition to the
desire to maintain "ordered liberty" in our society, it seems important to allow persons
whose rights have been deprived to recover compensatory (and in cases of intentional
deprivation of rights, punitive) damages against the officer who caused the infringement. See Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963); Hardy v. Kirchner, 232
F. Supp. 751 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
27See
note 100 supra and accompanying text. As the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit pointed out in Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962), the requirement of intent to deprive a person of rights as a necessary element of a due process
claim under § 1983 probably arose by mistake. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8
(1944), established the requirement of intent to discriminate in order to state an
equal protection claim, and that remains the law today. However, cases like Hoffman
v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959), overruled, Cohen v. Norris, supra and Agnew
v. City of Compton, 239 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 957 (1957),
overruled, Cohen v. Norris, supra, read the decision in Snowden as requiring intent
to deprive of rights as an element of a due process claim. In removing this requirement, Monroe merely rectified an interpretive error.
278 365 U.S. at 187.
27, See, e.g., Herschel v. Dyra, 865 F.2d 17

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973
(1966); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536
(10th Cir. 1963); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962); Cohen v. Norris, 300
F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
Since the Monroe decision in 1961, cases based on § 1983 have been brought against
various law enforcement officers alleging a deprivation of the following federal rights:
Freedom of Expression: e.g., Herschel v. Dyra, supra; Corsican Prods. v. Pitchess, 338
F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1964); Smith v. Cremins, supra; Wooten v. Ohler, 303 F.2d 759 (5th
Cir. 1962); Freedom from Illegal Search and Seizure: e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364
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However, the federal courts have not interpreted Monroe as
requiring the imposition of immediate liability in all cases in which
the two requisites are proved. 275

Instead they have allowed police

officers to avoid liability under section 1983 in two distinct situations.
First, if a law enforcement official violates a federal right while properly executing a judicial order, he will be completely insulated from
F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); Armstrong v. Rushing, 852 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1965); Sheridan
v. Williams, 33 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1964); York v. Story, 824 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 876 U.S. 939 (1964); Cohen v. Norris, supra; Freedom from Arbitrary
Discrimination:e.g., Due v. Tallahassee Theatres, Inc., 888 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1964);
Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 875 U.S. 975 (1964);
Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1962); Freedom from Coerced Confessions:
e.g., Stringer v. Dilger, supra; Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1961); Right
to Due Process: e.g., Nelson v. Hall, 868 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1966); Basista v. Weir, supra;
Due v. Tallahassee Theatres, Inc., supra; Wooten v. Ohler, supra; Hughes v. Noble,
295 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 871 U.S. 828 (1962); Hardwick v. Hurley,
supra. Stringer v. Dilger, supra, and Cohen v. Norris, supra, recite lists of federal
rights which, if violated, can become the basis of a § 1983 complaint.
Plaintiffs who establish § 1983 damage claims against nonimmune state officials may
find such defendants judgment-proof. After Monroe, it has been clear that § 1983
cannot provide a basis for recovery against his employer, the state or municipality.
Monroe v. Pape, 865 U.S. 167, 191-92 (1961); note 94 supra. However, it seems that
society should bear the cost of the mistakes of its agents, just as business enterprises
must pay damages for the torts of their servants. It appears that such governmental
liability could only be imposed by Congress-and not by the courts-if the states or
municipalities are not willing to take the initiative. This suggestion has been recommended in U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMNI'N, LAw ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE SoUr

179 (1965).

275Obviously, law enforcement officers are entitled to deny the allegations of the
complaint and then prove to the satisfaction of the court either that they were not
acting "under color of" state law, or that the plaintiff had been deprived of no
federal rights. A defense based on the theory that the officer violated no federal right
is frequently employed. See, e.g., Kamsler v. M.F.I Corp., 359 F.2d 752 (7th Cir.
1966); Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975
(1966); Harris v. Turner, 329 F.2d 918 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 907
(1964); Magee v. Williams, 329 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1964); Kinney v. Johnson, 319 F.2d
128 (5th Cir. 1963); Gager v. "Bob Seidel," 300 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 959 (1962).
Furthermore, the law enforcement officer may be able to escape liability under § 1983
by proving that the applicable statute of limitations had run in relation to the plaintiff's claim. See, e.g., Minchella v. Estate of Skillman, 356 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 861 (1966); Crawford v. Zeitler, 326 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1962). See also
Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 64 (1965).
In some cases, courts have dismissed claims against police officers because they deemed
the complaints "frivolous" or "spurious." However, dismissal on this basis is improper until after the court has taken jurisdiction of the case. See, e.g., Armstrong
v. Rushing, supra note 274; Harmon v. Superior Court of Calif., 807 F.2d 796 (9th Cir.
1962). The doctrine of abstention has also been used by some federal courts to avoid
finding liability against police officers. However, the availability of this doctrine in civil
rights cases has recently been restricted. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965); McNeece v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Marshall v. Sawyer, supra note
274.
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in the same manner that clerks of court and state prison

or hospital administrators are protected. 277 The judge's cloak of
official immunity shields the officer because he has no reasonable
choice but to comply with the order, even though his actions violate
federal rights. The justification appears to be that obedience and
respect for judicial orders is deemed more important than vindica27 1
tion of federal rights by means of a civil suit.
A second defense which law enforcement officials may assert
against section 1983 damages claims is that they acted with good faith
and probable cause. Although a number of lower federal courts had
considered this defense, 279 a question still remained as to whether it
21
had been abrogated by Monroe.25 0 However, in Pierson v. Ray, 8
the Supreme Court forthrightly approved the defense of good faith
and probable cause.28 2 In Pierson, defendant police officers arrested
plaintiffs, Negro and white clergymen, for breaching the peace by
participating in a civil rights demonstration. When similar arrests
20
Thus, in Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624 (D. Neb. 1962), aff'd, 309 F.2d
959 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963), the court stated: "Authorities performing orders issuing from a court are provided immunity when they do nothing
other than perform such orders." Id. at 636. See, in addition, Hurlburt v. Graham,
323 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1963); Puett v. City of Detroit, Department of Police, 823 F.2d
591 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 957 (1964); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d
280 (9th Cir. 1959), overruled on other grounds, Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th
Cir. 1962).
27 See notes 205-07, 226-32 supra and accompanying text.
278See cases cited note 276 supra.
210 See, e.g., Carmack v. Gibson, 363 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1966); Beauregard v. Wingard,
562 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1966); Attreau v. Morris, 357 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 832 (1966); Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965); Anderson v.
Haas, 341 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1965); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Marland
v. Heyse, 315 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1963); Hughes v. Noble, 295 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1961)
(per curiam). The probable cause defense was indirectly affirmed in Kinney v. Johnson, 319 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1963), which held there was no denial of federal rights
when arrest was made pursuant to legal warrant. On the other hand, in Nesmith v.
Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975 (1964), the court held
police defendants liable under § 1983 for arresting without a warrant.
Related to the probable cause defense is the rule that policemen sued under § 1983
for depriving others of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure are liable
only if the police action is deemed "unreasonable" by the jury. See Morgan v. Labiak,
368 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1966).
280In Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965), rev'd in part, 386 U.S. 547 (1967),
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held police officers liable even if they had
acted with probable cause in making the arrest. The court seemed to believe that
this result was dictated by Monroe.
28. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
28
2Id. at 557. The Court announced its decision in these words: "We hold that the
defense of good faith and probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found available
to the officers in the common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also
available to them in the action under § 1983." Ibid.
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unconstitutional, 283

were later declared
plaintiffs sued the police for
damages under section 1983. The officers defended on the theory
that "they should not be liable if they acted in good faith and with
probable cause in making an arrest under a statute that they believed
to be valid." 2 4 After finding that the Mississippi common law
accorded the police protection from tort liability when acting with
probable cause, 2 5 the Supreme Court ruled that the same defense
was available to them under section 1983.26 Mr. Chief Justice
Warren specifically stated that the Monroe decision did not abolish
this "limited privilege." 287 If it had, the law enforcement officer
would be forced "to choose between being charged with dereliction
of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being
mulcted in damages if he does." 28 Indeed, Monroe actually dictated
the recognition of the defense by requiring that section 1983 "be
read against the background of tort liability." 2 9 As the Pierson
majority pointed out, "part of the background of tort liability, in
the case of police officers making an arrest, is the defense of good
°290
faith and probable cause.
28 See Thomas v. Mississippi, 880 U.S. 524 (1965) (per curiam); note 172 supra.
2 8386 U.S. at 555.
28 Ibid. The Mississippi rule is the prevailing view among American jurisdictions.
See RE TATEMENT, TORTS § 121 (2d ed. 1965).
28

6Id. at 557. The Court's actual disposition of the case was to remand for a jury
determination as to whether the defendant officers actually had probable cause to arrest
the plaintiffs. At the initial trial of the case, the jury had decided in favor of the
defendant policemen, but the Court found that "its verdict was influenced by irrelevant
and8 prejudicial evidence." Id. at 558.
1 d. at 555.
288 Ibid.

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), quoted in 386 U.S. at 556.
The Pierson decision is not free of problems, one of its major ambiguities
being the meaning of the phrase "good faith and probable cause." The test of good
faith is generally considered subjective in nature: that is, the question is whether the
officer performed his duty of arrest with a bona fide, honest belief that the arrest was
justified. By contrast, the probable cause standard generally implies an objective
evaluation of the circumstances by the court or jury to determine whether the factual
situation would cause a reasonable man to believe that an arrest was warranted. See
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); PRossER, TORTS § 113, at 859-61 (3d ed. 1964).
Thus, in ordinary tort law probable cause sets a higher standard than good faith, and
is inclusive of good faith. However, Pierson makes no explicit distinction between the
two.
The resolution of this difficulty seems to lie in reading the terms "good faith"
and "probable cause" conjunctively: both must be present before the Piersonapproved defense can be asserted by policemen. The language of the Pierson
decision supports this interpretation, for the Chief Justice never mentioned the defense
except by the language of "good faith and probable cause." 886 U.S. at 557. (Emphasis
added.) Furthermore, in discussing the prevailing view concerning the law of arrest,
289

290 Ibid.
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Several public policies appear to be promoted by allowing a law
enforcement officer to avoid liability under section 1983 while acting
either according to judicial order or with probable cause. In the
first place, the courts' refusal to hold policemen liable when properly
enforcing a judicial order avoids the incongruity of imposing liability
for exercising a mandatory duty commanded by the court. In
addition, by finding liability for deviation from a judicial order in
a manner which would violate federal rights, the courts encourage
loyalty and obedience to superiors. Secondly a good faith and probable cause defense conforms to the general standard for determining
the validity of an arrest without a warrant.2 91 Thus, no new complications are added to the law. In short, by making the determinative
factor of police liability either loyalty to a responsible superior
authority or the rational exercise of the officer's own sound judgment,
the two exceptions to police liability under section 1983 place emphasis on the necessity for careful and responsible enforcement of
the law.
CONCLUSION

Section 1983 is not the sole federal remedy available to redress
violations of federal rights by persons acting "under color of" state
law. 292 Indeed, injunctions or damages may be obtained under other
the Court emphasized the requirement of probable cause over that of good faith. Ibid.
Since it is the generally prevailing state common law defense which the Court incorporated into the law governing § 1988, it seems that the standard must be at least
good faith and probable cause. If "good faith" alone were required to avoid § 1988
liability, the standard of evidence required for federal civil liability would be lower
than that for state liability. Clearly, this was not the intended result.
A second problem is that Pierson seemingly confficts with the three earliest
Supreme Court decisions under § 1983: Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) ; and Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 868 (1915). See notes
83-34 supra and accompanying text. In those cases, defendant election officials were
held liable under § 1988 for violating plaintiffs' voting rights while acting pursuant to
a state law which had not yet been declared unconstitutional. Their good faith
execution of .the law was no defense to their liability. Nevertheless, the Pierson result
seems more reasonable, for as Mr. Chief Justice Warren pointed out, the "policeman's
lot is not so unhappy" that he is placed in the dilemma of having to choose between
violating his duty by not arresting when he has probable cause and being liable in
damages if he does make the arrest under a law subsequently declared unconstitutional.
386 U.S. at 555.
201See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 879 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (as applied in search and seizure);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (as applied to arrests without

a warrant).
202 Section 1983 may be contrasted to many other federal civil rights laws which
have different purposes, but which are supplements to § 1988 as part of the overall
federal plan to protect federal rights. Thus, § 1983 does not authorize the removal
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laws, such as the federal conspiracy statute, section 1985 (3) of title
293
42 of the United States Code; the Civil Rights Act of 1964;294
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.25 However, section 1983 requires no showing of a purpose to violate federal rights, as seems
to be required under section 1985 (3).296 Moreover, relief is available
for any denials of federal rights under section 1983, whereas the
violation must fit the narrow categories of infringements specified by
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 before
federal redress is available under those enactments. 2 7 In short, as
of cases from state to federal courts when a civil rights issue is involved. That mode
of federal relief is available under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1964). Neither does § 1983 enable
one who has been convicted in violation of his federal rights to be released or retried,
that function being served by the federal habeas corpus provision, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55
(1964). Furthermore, § 1983 does not provide protection for society against those violating federal rights "under color of" authority, as does 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964), § 1983's
criminal counterpart. Finally, § 1983 does not empower the President to employ federal
troops, militia, or marshals to suppress domestic civil rights violence, as do 10 U.S.C.
§8 332-33 (1964).
...42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) (1964). The usefulness of this statute was severely limited
by the Supreme Court in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), where the Court
stated that the statute would be effective against private citizens only if the conspiracy was of the proportions of the Klan of 1871. While the Collins standard need
not be met where state officers are part of the conspiracy, many claims based on the
equal protection clause require proof of a purpose to discriminate. See Snowden v.
Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944). Thus, it would seem easier to establish a § 1983 due
process claim for damages against the officer and avoid the necesssity to prove the
existence of a conspiracy as required by § 1985 (3).
-9142 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-h (1964). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 empowers the Attorney General of the United States to initiate actions for injunctive relief upon
receiving complaints of state violations of the equal protection of the laws. It does not
permit him to intervene where the claim against the state rests on due process of
law. See U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, LAW ENFORCEMENT: A STUDY OF EQUAL PROTECTION
However, the 1964 Act takes into consideration the imIN THE SoTH 123-24 (1965).
portance of maintaining the federal-state balance, as explained in Stefanelli v. Minard,
342 U.S. 117 (1951), notes 81-86 supra, by providing statutory delays before the federal
agencies may act, in order to give the States the first opportunity to correct the problem. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 2000a-3 (c), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (b) (1964).
973 973
.295 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1 -1 p (Supp. I 1965), authorized federal civil relief and criminal penalties for state-caused denials of the right to
vote. Thus, the Attorney General of the United States may seek injunctive relief
against the state, its agents, or persons acting "under color of" state law who deprive
anyone of his right to vote, as protected by .the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 42 U.S.C. 1973 (c) (Supp. I 1965). 42 U.S.C. 1973j (a), (b), and (c) (Supp.
I 1965) provide criminal penalties for those who violate the rights protected by the
1965 Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973j (d) and (e) (Supp. I 1965) empower the Attorney General
to seek federal preventive relief and court orders to require state officials to permit all
qualified persons to vote.
206 See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951); note 293 supra. Another major
difference between § 1983 and § 1985 (3) is that damages is the only remedy available
under § 1985 (3).
217 Along with § 1985 (3), the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
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the broadest and most general of federal civil remedies for civil
rights violations, section 1983 is available to fill the gaps left by the
more narrowly drawn statutes.
As a general civil remedy, section 1983 has been increasingly
utilized during the last two decades to compensate persons whose federal rights have been infringed.29 8 The statute seems to have been
reasonably effective in providing redress against law enforcement
officials, prison and hospital administrators, and local boards and
councils. However, even against these officials, section 1983 is not
free of such difficulties as the unpredictability of jury verdicts; the
fact that the individual plaintiff must take the initiative to institute
the suit; and the fear that the grievance complained of will be considered a valid restriction of liberty or property imposed with "reasonable discretion." Furthermore, when the remedies of section 1983
are sought against judges, prosecutors, legislators, or high executive
officials, the doctrines of official immunity and federal comity operate
as substantial obstructions to recovery. On the other hand, even
though these doctrines may restrict the aim of section 1983 to provide
a federal means of civil redress for infringements of federal rights,
they seem required by the necessity of resolving the conflict between
the purpose of section 1983 and the continued efficacy of state government in our federal structure. 299 In sum, it is because the federal
courts have been able to utilize the doctrines of comity and immunity
in section 1983 suits that a reasonable compromise of the conflict and
a workable balance between state and federal governments has been
attained, while at the same time section 1983 has continued to
1965 are designed to enforce only the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. By contrast, § 1983 is available as a federal remedy to persons who are deprived
of procedural and substantive due process of law, as well as equal protection of the
laws. Since the due process clause applies many of the rights protected in the first
eight amendments against the states, § 1983 seems immensely more useful than any
federal remedy based solely on equal protection.
20s Indeed, virtually the enitre judicial evolution of § 1983 has taken place over a
period starting in 1945 with Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947).
200 Official immunity promotes the efficacy of state government by insuring the independence of decision-making by "discretionary" officers. Federal comity seeks to
prevent federal intervention into state functions which are typically considered incidents
of state autonomy. Federal respect for state autonomy rests on the premise that, in
our federal system, the states ought to be allowed to carry out many activities without
federal interference. See note 71 supra.
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provide civil relief in the majority of cases where federal rights are
30
violated by state officials.
300 There is a growing body of evidence that gross inequities exist in the administra.
tion of government at the state and local level, especially in the courts. See James,
The Crisis in the Courts, Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 12, 1967, p. 13; Apr. 19, 1967,
p. 11; Apr. 26, 1967, p. 9; May 3, 1967, p. 9; May 10, 1967, p. 9; May 17, 1967, p. 9;
May 24, 1967, p. 9. See generally THE PRESIDENT'S CONNI'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE, TiHE CHALLNGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocmTY (1967).
Therefore, the argument has been advanced that an expanded civil liability under
§ 1983 could stimulate much-needed reforms in state governmental procedures. However, to accomplish this end through the means of § 1983, the abolition of the doctrines
of comity and immunity would be required. Yet it seems that direct political and
administrative revisions would be more desirable .than the indirect approach of threatening state officials with personal liability in federal court. Furthermore, the abrogation of immunity and comity would give free rein to the consequences of which Judge
Learned Hand expressed fear in Gregorie v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950); note 212 supra.

